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WHAT DID RONALD COASE KNOW 
ABOU T THE L AW OF TORT? 
DAV I D  CA M P B E L L *  
A N D  M AT T H IA S  KL A E S †  
In 1996, Brian Simpson criticised the legal competence of the discussion of the nineteenth 
century land law case of Sturges v Bridgman in Ronald Coase’s ‘The Problem of Social 
Cost’, and Coase responded to these criticisms. The discussion of Sturges v Bridgman was 
central to Coase’s law and economics, and Simpson’s aim in showing it to be unacceptable 
as legal scholarship was to reveal fundamental ethical and theoretical shortcomings in 
Coase’s general approach. In revisiting this neglected debate, our aim is not so much to 
shed new light on the debate itself but to draw fresh insight from that debate in order to 
address current issues in economics and in law. Without denying Simpson’s criticism of 
Coase’s legal scholarship, we will show that the approach Simpson criticised was, indeed, 
one Coase himself rejected. By explaining how Coase came to treat Sturges v Bridgman 
in the way he did, we will seek to develop key aspects, not only of Simpson’s criticism, but 
of Coase’s response, and of the original arguments in ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ to 
which both refer. Though Coase’s attempt to draw on legal materials in ‘The Problem of 
Social Cost’ was highly commendable in its intent, the roles played by Sturges v Bridg-
man in particular — and by the positive law of private nuisance in law and economics 
generally — are difficult ones which have generated a great deal of misunderstanding of 
Coase’s theoretical argument. Paradoxically, it turns out that Coase’s analysis of nuisance 
cases leads to there being too much ‘state’ and not nearly enough ‘voluntary exchange’ in 
his seminal article. We argue that this contributed to an excessive emphasis on Posnerian 
wealth maximisation in subsequent law and economics, and therefore to an inadequate 
appreciation of the possibilities of exchange in economic and legal policy. 
 
 * BSc (Econ) (Cardiff), LLM (Michigan), PhD (Edinburgh), FCI (Arb); Professor of Law, 
Lancaster University Law School. 
 † Dipl-Wirtsch-Ing (Darmstadt), MA (Keele), MSc, PhD (Edinburgh), FHEA; Professor of the 
History and Philosophy of Economics, University of Dundee. This article was presented as a 
paper at the First Conference of the World Interdisciplinary Network for Institutional Re-
search (University of Greenwich, London, September 2014) and to ‘The Problem of Social 
Cost’ Revisited Workshop (Sheffield Institute of Corporate and Commercial Law, University 
of Sheffield, November 2014). We are grateful for comments made at those presentations, 
particularly those of Robert Burrell, and for comments by Rosalee Dorfman, Stephen Little-
child, John Murphy and the Editors and their anonymous referees. We are also grateful to 
David Ibbetson, Jonathan Morgan, Warren Swain and Keith Tribe for their help with points 
of archival and legal historical research. 
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I   I N T R O D U C T IO N 
It must be counted as a remarkable achievement even amongst the very many 
achievements which distinguished the career of the late Brian Simpson that he 
unarguably once came out best from a debate with the late Ronald Coase. In a 
1996 article,1 Simpson made some fundamental criticisms of the competence 
of Coase’s handling of the law in ‘The Problem of Social Cost’,2 particularly 
 
 1 A W Brian Simpson, ‘Coase v Pigou Reexamined’ (1996) 25 Journal of Legal Studies 53, 
revised as A W Brian Simpson, ‘The Story of Sturges v Bridgman: The Resolution of Land Use 
Disputes between Neighbours’ in Gerald Korngold and Andrew P Morriss (eds), Property 
Stories (Foundation Press, 2004) 9. Unless another intention is expressed, hereinafter refer-
ences are to the revised version. In a 2009 second edition of the Korngold and Morriss text, 
Simpson’s paper is reproduced exactly as it was in the first edition except that, instead of 
running from 9–40, it runs from 11–42. 
 2 R H Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ (1960) 3 Journal of Law and Economics 1, reprinted 
as R H Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ in R H Coase (ed), The Firm, the Market, and the 
Law (University of Chicago Press, 1988) 95. Unless another intention is expressed, herein-
after references are to the reprinted version. 
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the law of nuisance in Sturges v Bridgman3 on which Coase had focused. The 
response which Coase made simply failed to deal with these criticisms,4 
indeed it served only an occasion for Simpson to somewhat forcibly reaffirm 
them,5 and this failure was due to the very good reason that those criticisms 
were perfectly accurate. Though Coase never made any pretension to ability in 
legal scholarship,6 and did not see ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ as a contribu-
tion to such scholarship in any direct sense,7 it obviously is more than a little 
embarrassing that the article which is one of the foundations of law and 
economics does not competently handle the law. The, as it were, theoretical 
rather than doctrinal contribution which Coase undoubtedly thought he had 
made ‘to the analysis of the law of nuisance’8 cannot be properly made out 
unless it is expressed in doctrinally competent terms. 
It is surprising, then, that this debate between Simpson and Coase has 
been largely ignored, not just in the disciplines of law and of economics as 
they continue to draw on ‘The Problem of Social Cost’, but in the specific field 
of law and economics itself. Simpson was strongly and bitterly of the opinion 
that the significance of his criticisms had been very insufficiently appreciated, 
and in the book on which he was working at the time of his death in January 
2011 he wrote of his article: ‘No serious response has yet been made to the 
arguments there presented; devotees of law and economics pretend the piece 
does not exist’.9 
 
 3 (1879) 11 Ch D 852. Argument and judgment in the Chancery Division of the High Court 
and the Court of Appeal are both reported here: 854–9 (Jessel MR), 860–6 (Thesiger LJ for 
the Court). 
 4 See R H Coase, ‘Law and Economics and A W Brian Simpson’ (1996) 25 Journal of Legal 
Studies 103 (‘Reply to Simpson’). 
 5 See A W Brian Simpson, ‘An Addendum’ (1996) 25 Journal of Legal Studies 99. See also 
below n 182. 
 6 Coase, ‘Reply to Simpson’, above n 4, 105. In Ronald H Coase, ‘Blackmail’ (1988) 74 Virginia 
Law Review 655, 655–6, Coase made a similar disavowal of competence in the law and then 
proceeded to make some extremely penetrating comments on the law relating to blackmail. 
 7 Coase, ‘Reply to Simpson’, above n 4, 104–5, quoting R H Coase, ‘Law and Economics at 
Chicago’ (1993) 36 Journal of Law and Economics 239, 250–1. 
 8 Coase, ‘Blackmail’, above n 6, 656. 
 9 A W Brian Simpson, Reflections on The Concept of Law (Oxford University Press, 2011) 136. 
In a review of Simpson’s magisterial history of the impact of the establishment of the Europe-
an Convention on the law of public order in the decolonising British Empire, one of the 
current authors did comment on Simpson’s criticism of Coase and Simpson certainly was 
aware of this, having commented extensively on this review: David Campbell, ‘Human Rights 
and the Critique of the Common Law’, Book Review: Human Rights and the End of Empire: 
Britain and the Genesis of the European Convention by A W Brian Simpson (2005) 26 Cardozo 
Law Review 791, 812–18. But overall it is fair to say that the details of Simpson’s criticism 
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In this article we intend to put forward such a response. It will not dispute 
Simpson’s evaluation of Coase’s handling of Sturges v Bridgman as legal 
scholarship; indeed we will say something about Coase’s undergraduate legal 
studies that rather reinforces what, we repeat, were perfectly accurate criti-
cisms. But our response nevertheless amounts to an affirmation of Coase’s 
views because, whilst Coase handles the formal law badly, Simpson’s handling 
of the theoretical issues behind the law is far worse. This was the gist of the 
response Coase himself made to Simpson,10 but we believe that this response 
could and should have been developed much more systematically than Coase 
himself did. Simpson by no means criticised Coase’s legal scholarship in order 
just to make a point about the quality of that scholarship. Simpson was 
profoundly averse to law and economics as he understood the discipline and, 
generously acknowledging the impact of Coase’s ‘celebrated article’ on a 
‘legal world [which] has never been quite the same since’,11 he used his 
criticisms of Coase’s legal scholarship as the springboard for a dismissal of 
Coase’s views in general.12 But, as is not unknown in criticisms of Coase’s law 
and economics, Simpson showed such little understanding of Coase’s ap-
proach that he essentially criticised positions the rejection of which is central 
to that approach. 
Our overall aim, however, is not just to restate Coase’s discussion of Sturg-
es v Bridgman so that its basic value survives Simpson’s criticisms. It is to build 
on this to advance the understanding of the possibilities of exchange, particu-
larly in respect of the law of nuisance. It will emerge the that the principal 
obstacles to more robustly restating Coase’s position in legal terms are not the 
shortcomings of Coase’s handling of the law, though we repeat that these are 
not denied, but the difficulties inherent in the conception of private property 
that lies behind Sturges v Bridgman and behind the law of private nuisance in 
general. The positive law of private nuisance is, we will argue, particularly 
 
have attracted little attention. Even in those contributions to legal scholarship which directly 
address the key themes involved, the debate is relegated to the footnotes: see, eg, Daniel A 
Farber, ‘Parody Lost/Paradigm Regained: The Ironic History of the Coase Theorem’ (1997) 83 
Virginia Law Review 397, 411–12 n 41; Ward Farnsworth, ‘Do Parties to Nuisance Cases 
Bargain after Judgment? A Glimpse inside the Cathedral’ (1999) 66 University of Chicago Law 
Review 373, 401 n 43; Ron Harris, ‘The Uses of History in Law and Economics’ (2003) 4 
Theoretical Inquiries in Law 659, 680 n 42; Herbert Hovenkamp, ‘The Coase Theorem and 
Arthur Cecil Pigou’ (2009) 51 Arizona Law Review 633, 633 n 2. 
 10 Coase, ‘Reply to Simpson’, above n 4, 105. 
 11 Simpson, ‘The Story of Sturges v Bridgman’, above n 1, 9, 28. 
 12 See also ibid 24–9 where Simpson mounts a particular defence of Pigou against Coase’s 
criticisms of him. We put this to one side. 
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unsuitable as an illustration of a real world application of Coasean bargaining 
since that law is not a system of what Calabresi and Melamed called property 
rules, but a liability rule generally qualifying property rights in the public 
interest,13 though that interest is generally but unclearly formulated. Once this 
is understood, it is unsurprising that much of the discussion of ‘The Problem 
of Social Cost’ has been led by Coase’s manner of argument to concentrate, 
not on Coasean bargaining, but on alternatives to such bargaining: the firm, 
the government, and cases decided by courts which stipulate outcomes. For 
courts making decisions by stipulating outcomes are not providing a frame-
work for the parties to reach their own decisions but are intervening just as 
much as a government pursuing prescriptive regulation through statute. There 
is, in the end, too much state and not nearly enough voluntary exchange in 
‘The Problem of Social Cost’. We regard this as the chief factor contributing to 
the excessive emphasis on Posnerian wealth maximisation in law and eco-
nomics, an emphasis which has most unfortunately predominantly been 
regarded as following from a commitment to ‘free markets’ when it is, indeed, 
its opposite. 
II   C OA S E ’S  U S E  O F  ST U R G E S  V  BR I D G M A N  
In ‘The Federal Communications Commission’, the article on broadcasting 
policy of which he famously intended ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ to be a 
generalising restatement, Coase used the 19th century land law case of 
Sturges v Bridgman to illustrate the theoretical argument which underlay the 
policy proposal made in the first article and which was brought to the fore in 
the second.14 Sturges v Bridgman is also the first15 of ‘four actual cases’ which 
 
 13 Guido Calabresi and A Douglas Melamed, ‘Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: 
One View of the Cathedral’ (1972) 85 Harvard Law Review 1089, 1105–6, 1115–16. 
 14 R H Coase, ‘The Federal Communications Commission’ (1959) 2 Journal of Law and 
Economics 1, 26–7. Coase referred to this discussion, without citation of the case, when 
setting up his argument in Part II of ‘The Problem of Social Cost’: Coase, ‘The Problem of 
Social Cost’, above n 2, 96. 
 15 At the beginning of Part V of ‘The Problem of Social Cost’, Coase had briefly mentioned two 
cases as illustrations that ‘[t]he harmful effects of the activities of a business can assume a 
wide variety of forms’: Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ above n 2, 104. One of these is an 
ancient case about the obstruction of the flow of wind to a windmill which we do not think 
can be precisely identified but which Coase knew from its discussion in the then current 
edition of a standard English work on land law: Michael Bowles, Gale on Easements (Sweet & 
Maxwell, 13th ed, 1959) 237–9. This case had been discussed in Gale on Easements since its 
first edition: C J Gale and T D Whatley, A Treatise on the Law of Easements (S Sweet, 1st ed, 
1839) 197–8. On the very poorly known facts it is very difficult to reconcile this case with the 
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Coase used in Part V of ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ to ‘clarify’ and ‘illustrate’ 
his argument in that article up to that point.16 That argument had two 
components, each of which has proven to be enormously influential and now 
are so well known as to need only brief exposition here. 
In Parts I and II of ‘The Problem of Social Cost’, Coase had set up the 
problem of the harmful incidental effects of economic action and had shown 
that these could be analysed as an instance of the general problem of allocat-
ing scarce resources between competing uses, and so amenable to the toolset 
of modern economics. As we shall show, much of the debate between Simp-
son and Coase turns on the shortcomings of the way Coase sought to illus-
trate this theoretical argument with concrete case material. It is therefore 
worthwhile to examine Coase’s treatment of this material in much more detail 
than is normal in the secondary literature on ‘The Problem of Social Cost’. 
In Part II of ‘The Problem of Social Cost’, Coase had shown, as it was put 
in the heading of that section, ‘The Reciprocal Nature’ of problems such as 
pollution. To regard a side effect of an economic activity such as the factory 
emission of smoke in the course of industrial production, which Coase rightly 
says is a ‘standard example’,17 as a harm can be very misleading when seeking 
to formulate policy toward such a side effect. Describing the side effect as a 
harm implies that it should be prevented. But prevention imposes the costs of 
preventive measures and of lost output, and complete prevention of this sort 
 
modern law of easements of light and air, and Coase briefly notes that a modern case — 
Webb v Bird (1863) 13 CB NS 841; 143 ER 332, cited in Gale on Easements at 238–9; Sturges v 
Bridgman (1879) 11 Ch D 852, 855, 857 (Jessel MR), 864 (Thesiger LJ for the Court) — does 
not follow it: Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’, above n 2, 121. The ancient authorities are 
in fact now only of historical interest and are described as such in the current edition of Gale 
on Easements, their discussion having been eliminated since the 14th edition of 1972: Jona-
than Gaunt and Justice Paul Morgan, Gale on Easements (Sweet & Maxwell, 19th ed, 2012) 
388 [8-02] n 6. Webb v Bird was itself variously commented upon, followed or distinguished 
in three of Coase’s four cases: Sturges v Bridgman (1879) 11 Ch D 852; Bryant v Lefever 
(1878–9) LR 4 CPD 172; Bass v Gregory (1890) 25 QBD 481. This unsatisfactory thread of 
argument, if this is the right description, does demonstrate shortcomings which directly 
follow from the deficiencies of Coase’s legal scholarship, which we discuss below in Part IV of 
this article. The other case concerns obstruction of the sunshine formerly benefitting the 
outdoor recreational areas of a hotel: Fontainebleau Hotel Corp v Forty-Five Twenty-Five Inc, 
114 So 2d 357 (Fla Ct App, 1959). Coase no doubt cited this only because it was a timely 
illustration, having been decided as he was drafting his article, but, largely because of his use 
of it, it has become a much cited case in United States legal scholarship. 
 16 Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’, above n 2, 104–5. 
 17 Ibid 95. The use of this example in the literature of modern welfare economics can be 
traced to Arthur Cecil Pigou, The Economics of Welfare (Transaction Publishers, first pub-
lished 1920, 2002 ed) 184, and indeed to its forerunner: A C Pigou, Wealth and Welfare 
(Macmillan, 1912) 159. 
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of harm is inconsistent with industrial production, which would have to cease. 
To those who place a positive value on industrial production, prevention of 
such a harm cannot, then, be the aim of policy. The aim must be determining 
the optimal level of the activity taking the economic value of its overall effects 
into account, whether or not those effects are conventionally regarded as 
desirable or harmful. On this basis, without further consideration of the 
issues, it is difficult to see why the level of side effects should be determined in 
a different way than any other aspect of economic action, the level of which 
should be determined by exchange. 
In Part III of ‘The Problem of Social Cost’, headed ‘The Pricing System 
with Liability for Damage’, Coase had shown that, assuming zero transaction 
costs, bargaining between the actor conventionally thought to be inflicting the 
harm and the actor conventionally thought to be its victim would allow us to 
arrive at the optimal level of the harm, for that bargaining would establish the 
highest valued overall allocation of resources between the parties. In this 
optimal allocation, the level of harm might be zero but it equally could 
assume any other level depending on the outcome of the negotiations. In 
Coase’s terms, the optimal level of harm is that which maximises the overall 
value of production. In the absence of transaction costs, that outcome is 
invariant with respect to the initial allocation of liability, in quite the same 
way that the optimal allocation of resources in a perfectly competitive market 
is independent of the initial allocation of those resources.18 Coase illustrates 
this in Part IV, headed ‘The Pricing System with No Liability for Damage’, 
where he repeats the analysis on the basis of the opposite initial position. 
Taken together, these Parts establish what has in various forms been called the 
‘Coase Theorem’, a term and to a considerable extent a concept first invoked, 
not by Coase,19 but by George Stigler,20 with the result that in the period 
immediately after its publication ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ was largely 
interpreted through the conceptual lens of the Coase Theorem. This has had 
the overall malign effect that the remainder of ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ 
after Part IV still remains to be properly understood in all the various fields of 
scholarship in which that article has been so widely acknowledged. 
In Sturges v Bridgman, a plaintiff doctor was granted a perpetual prohibi-
tory injunction against a confectioner’s use of machinery in neighbouring 
 
 18 See generally Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’, above n 2, 100–2. 
 19 R H Coase, ‘Notes on the Problem of Social Cost’ in R H Coase, The Firm, the Market, and 
the Law (University of Chicago Press, 1988) 157; R H Coase, Essays on Economics and Econ-
omists (University of Chicago Press, 1994) 3, 10. 
 20 George J Stigler, The Theory of Price (Macmillan, 3rd ed, 1966) 113. 
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premises in such a way as caused noise and vibration which unreasonably 
interfered with the doctor’s use of his consulting room. Coase’s discussions of 
the case in ‘The Federal Communications Commission’ and in Part V of ‘The 
Problem of Social Cost’ were similarly brief, in the latter article consisting of 
two long paragraphs occupying less than three pages.21 In fact it was briefer 
than that, for the actual account of the case was conveyed in the shorter, first 
of the two paragraphs and amounted to no more than we have just conveyed, 
save that Coase ended the paragraph with an unattributed quotation from the 
judgment of the United Kingdom Court of Appeal to which we will return.22 
Most of the discussion in the longer, second paragraph considered the 
bargaining possibilities which Coase thought were open to the parties once 
the Court had settled the question of liability. The doctor having been granted 
the injunction, the possibilities were identified by Coase in the following way: 
The doctor would have been willing to waive his right and allow the machinery 
to continue in operation if the confectioner would have paid him a sum of 
money which was greater than the loss of income which he would suffer from 
having to move to a more costly or less convenient location, from having to 
curtail his activities at this location, or (and this was suggested as a possibility) 
from having to build a wall which would deaden the noise and vibration. The 
confectioner would have been willing to do this if the amount he would have 
had to pay the doctor was less than the fall in income he would suffer if he had 
to change his mode of operation at this location, abandon his operation, or 
move his confectionery business to some other location.23 
Coase argued that, if the injunction had been refused, then ‘[t]he boot would 
have been on the other foot: the doctor would have had to pay the confection-
er to induce him to stop using the machinery’.24 Though the judgment would 
affect who has to initiate negotiations, the possibilities and the outcome would 
be the same. 
In essence, Coase used Sturges v Bridgman to clarify and illustrate what 
have come to be known as the ‘invariance’ and the ‘efficiency’ aspects of the 
 
 21 Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’, above n 2, 105–7. 
 22 See below Part V(B). 
 23 Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’, above n 2, 105–6. In relation to the suggested possibility 
of building a wall, Simpson rightly argues that this is not so: Simpson, ‘The Story of Sturges v 
Bridgman’, above n 1, 31. The passage to which Coase presumably refers was part of the 
report of the confectioner’s evidence at trial which was aimed at showing that the way the 
claimant had built his consulting room had in part caused the dispute, as, indeed, it appears 
was the case: Sturges v Bridgman (1879) 11 Ch D 852, 854. 
 24 Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’, above n 2, 106. 
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Coase Theorem. Whether the confectioner or the doctor had to start the 
negotiations, ‘[t]he solution of the problem depends essentially on whether 
the continued use of the machinery adds more to the confectioner’s income 
than it subtracts from the doctor’s’.25 In this account, the courts did not 
stipulate the outcome. The courts’ statement of the initial legal position 
provided the framework in which the parties chose the outcome: 
the immediate question faced by the courts is not what shall be done by whom 
but who has the legal right to do what. It is always possible to modify by trans-
actions on the market the initial legal delimitation of rights. And, of course, if 
such market transactions are costless, such a rearrangement of rights will al-
ways take place if it will lead to an increase in the value of production.26 
The fundamental reason why these views have attracted such attention is 
Coase’s contention that, if left to bargaining, the ‘correct’ level of the harmful 
side effect will not depend on how rights are initially allocated. All that this 
initial allocation specifies is which of the parties needs to start the bargaining, 
if it sees scope for economic gain by engaging in market exchange which will 
alter the level of the effect. The result is Pareto efficient in the sense that, if all 
affected parties are involved in the bargaining process, the result will be one 
which leaves them all at least as well off as they initially were, whilst all 
opportunities to improve the position of any individual party will have been 
exhausted. This outcome can rightly and usefully be described as perfectly 
efficient in the way that it gives complete effect to voluntary choice.27 The 
Coase Theorem has all the attractions of Pareto efficiency though it applies to 
situations previously thought categorically to be outside of the Pareto domain. 
What is more, the efficiency of the outcome seems to be spontaneous in the 
strong sense that it is invariant regardless of whether the confectioner or the 
doctor has to start the bargaining: ‘With costless market transactions, the 
decision of the courts concerning liability for damage would be without effect 
on the allocation of resources’.28 The bargaining which Coase describes in his 
account of the case is essentially that in the now famous hypothetical example 
he had used in Parts III and IV of ‘The Problem of Social Cost’: ‘The basic 
 
 25 Ibid. 
 26 Ibid 114 (emphasis in original). 
 27 There can be no doubt that, in expressing himself in terms of, as in the passage just quoted, 
‘an increase in the value of production’, Coase unwittingly caused confusion in how he con-
ceived of efficiency, and this confusion has, in a sense, been the foundation of law and eco-
nomics. See below n 169 and accompanying text. 
 28 Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’, above n 2, 106. 
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conditions are exactly the same in this case as they were in the example of the 
cattle which destroyed crops’.29 In this way Sturges v Bridgman was to serve, as 
we have seen Coase maintain, as an ‘actual’ case illustrative of his argument.30 
In the remainder of his longer, second paragraph, Coase turned to an anal-
ysis of the thinking of the judges in Sturges v Bridgman: ‘It was of course the 
view of the judges that they were affecting the working of the economic 
system — and in a desirable direction’.31 This is an entirely different line of 
thought and, with respect, Coase provided the occasion for much of the 
subsequent confusion by failing to set this different line out in a new para-
graph starting with the sentence just quoted. We shall discuss this at length 
below in Part VI(C)(2), but first let us consider Simpson’s criticisms of Coase’s 
account of the case as we have described it so far. 
III   S I M P S O N’ S  CR I T I C I S M  O F  COA S E ’S  A C C O U N T 
O F  S T U R G E S  V  BR I D G M A N  
Simpson argued that Coase’s account of Sturges v Bridgman was highly 
inaccurate and, as legal history, wholly unacceptable. As Simpson is right and 
as our concern here is not so much with legal history as with the theoretical 
issues of law and economics that Simpson raised, we will be very brief. 
Though neither in the passage of ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ we have just 
discussed nor in ‘The Federal Communications Commission’ does Coase 
describe Sturges v Bridgman as a case of private nuisance, he does do so later 
in ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ and elsewhere,32 and he undoubtedly saw it as 
such a case, being aware that nuisance is a core private law doctrine regulating 
interference with another’s enjoyment of their land and so dealing with the 
problem of competing uses he sought to address. In this sense, as we have 
noted, Coase saw ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ as contributing ‘to the analysis 
of the law of nuisance’.33 But the reported case of Sturges v Bridgman wholly 
contradicts the way Coase established both ‘the reciprocal nature of the 
problem’ and what was to become the Coase Theorem. 
What Coase saw as the reciprocal aspect of the case was completely dealt 
with in the first sentence of Jessel MR’s judgment at first instance: ‘I think this 
 
 29 Ibid 97–104, 106. 
 30 Ibid 105. 
 31 Ibid 106–7. 
 32 See Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’, above n 2, 113 n 13; R H Coase, Essays on Economics 
and Economists, above n 19, 121 n 11. 
 33 Coase, ‘Blackmail’, above n 6, 656. 
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is a clear case for the Plaintiff. There is really no dispute as to this being a 
nuisance; in fact, the evidence is all one way’.34 That is all that was said there, 
and in the Court of Appeal nothing much was said in addition: ‘It has been 
proved that … a noise was caused which seriously inconvenienced the 
Plaintiff in the use of his consulting-room … which … would constitute an 
actionable nuisance’.35 As Simpson in essence pointed out,36 there is simply 
nothing in the ratio of the case that justified Coase’s claim that Sturges v 
Bridgman is evidence of a judicial perception of the reciprocal nature of the 
problem.37 Quite the opposite in fact. Though the language of harm is not 
used at all, the noise and vibration was indeed seen as a harm which should be 
prevented.38 No sense that the doctor’s use of his consulting room (and his 
wish to be free of noise and vibration in order to do so) was only a competing 
use — not in any way intrinsically superior to the confectioner’s use of his 
machinery (and his wish to cause noise and vibration in order to do so) — 
forms part of the ratio at all. 
Nor did anything like the Coase Theorem play any part in deciding the 
outcome of the case. The case actually was argued and decided on the basis of 
it raising a flat clash of unqualified property rights. As (once the facts were 
proved)39 the decision that the confectioner was causing a nuisance was 
reached instantly, Sturges v Bridgman as argued is barely a nuisance case at all, 
though we shall see it does involve, and has come to be authority for, an 
important implication of the basic principle of the positive law of private 
nuisance. It effectively being decided at the outset that the noise and vibration 
was a nuisance, ‘[t]he only serious point’ in the actual argument was whether 
the defendant ‘was entitled … to … commit a nuisance’ because he ‘had 
 
 34 Sturges v Bridgman (1879) 11 Ch D 852, 854–5. 
 35 Ibid 862 (Thesiger LJ for the Court). 
 36 Simpson, ‘The Story of Sturges v Bridgman’, above n 1, 35: ‘There were no suggestions that Dr 
Sturges’ activities were causing any problem for Mr Bridgman’. However, Simpson also insists 
that ‘[t]he case certainly illustrates the reciprocal nature of the problem of social cost’: at 29. 
We shall return to this; indeed explaining how Simpson can take up both of these positions is 
an important aim of this article: see below n 167 and accompanying text. 
 37 See Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’, above n 2, 133. 
 38 Simpson mentions the doctrinal issues of causation that could possibly arise at this point, but 
discussion of these, about which Coase no doubt was largely ignorant, cannot be justified 
here: Simpson, ‘The Story of Sturges v Bridgman’, above n 1, 20. 
 39 Using court documents lodged in the United Kingdom Public Record Office: ibid 13–15. 
Simpson valuably sets these facts out in greater detail than the report of the case itself. 
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acquired a right to impose the inconvenience [that otherwise] would consti-
tute an actionable nuisance’.40 
Two in substance identical arguments, one at statute and one at common 
law, that the confectioner had acquired such a right by prescription were 
actually considered in the case.41 At the time of Sturges v Bridgman, acquisi-
tion by prescription had been made subject to the Prescription Act 1832,42 
which is still in force. Though it seems that the Act was meant to completely 
supersede common law prescription, shortcomings in its drafting meant that 
it signally failed to do so,43 and the legal fiction of ‘the doctrine of lost modern 
grant’ remained, and continues to remain, part of the English law.44 Both the 
statutory and common law arguments were possible because the confectioner 
had long used the machinery in the way of which the doctor complained, and 
we shall return to this important fact.45 But, for reasons of space, we shall not 
explain why both of these arguments failed,46 save to say that they were again 
considered as part of the definition of what would be, as defined, unqualified 
property rights. 
Simpson’s account of the way the case was understood, by the parties and 
by the judges, was right to place the assertion of mutually exclusive unquali-
fied property rights at the heart of the matter — and, believing himself to have 
established ‘the gulf which separates Coase’s economic analysis from legal 
analysis’,47 he undoubtedly showed that Coase’s account of the case is, as legal 
history, just wrong: 
 
 40 Sturges v Bridgman (1879) 11 Ch D 852, 855 (Jessel MR), 862 (Thesiger LJ for the Court). 
 41 Ibid 855 (Jessel MR), 863 (Thesiger LJ for the Court). 
 42 Prescription Act 1832, 2 & 3 Wm 4, c 71 (‘Prescription Act 1832’). 
 43 Simpson’s own account of these shortcomings is as clear as the subject permits and it 
concludes that ‘[t]he Act is a classic example of an incompetent attempt to reform the law’: 
A W B Simpson, A History of the Land Law (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 1986) 269. 
 44 Of this situation, Lord Neuberger, then the Master of the Rolls and now President of the 
United Kingdom Supreme Court, said in London Tara Hotel Ltd v Kensington Close Hotel Ltd 
[2012] 2 All ER 554, 559 [20]: 
The law … [of] long use has been bedevilled with artificial doctrines developed over 
many centuries, and … has been complicated rather than assisted by the notoriously ill-
drafted Prescription Act 1832, whose survival on the statute book for over 175 years pro-
vides some support for the adage that only the good die young. 
 45 See below nn 90–93 and accompanying text. 
 46 Incidentally to the discussion of another of the four cases he uses for illustrative purposes in 
Part V, Coase does essentially capture the main reason the lost grant argument failed in 
Sturges v Bridgman: Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’, above n 2, 113 n 13. 
 47 Simpson, ‘The Story of Sturges v Bridgman’, above n 1, 23. 
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from a legal point of view the … question to settle was whether Mr Bridgman 
was, as he claimed, entitled to continue his noisy activities, through having, 
over the years, acquired a right to do so … It was more or less conceded that 
unless Mr Bridgman could show that he had acquired such a right he had in-
vaded the rights of the doctor. The judge ruled that no such right had been ac-
quired … and Dr Sturges got his injunction. Plainly the issue in the case, as 
seen by Sir George Jessel, had nothing whatever to do with the question — 
‘whether the continued use of the machinery adds more to the confectioner’s 
income than it subtracts from the doctor’s.’ In the legal scheme of things that 
was not a matter which had to be decided, or indeed had any relevance to the 
outcome. … The case was then taken on appeal, and the main issue ventilated 
was the same — had Mr Bridgman acquired the right to make the noise? The 
judges thought he had not … the particular decision pays not the least attention 
to the … two conflicting forms of land use. … [T]he judicial opinions in the 
case, like the affidavits on which they are based, make not the least attempt to 
investigate the economic or social value of the activities of either confectioner 
or doctor.48 
In our opinion, nothing that Coase said in his reply to Simpson alters this,49 
but to the extent that the main themes of that reply seem to have been a 
separation of the professional competences of economists and lawyers,50 and a 
refusal to defend the positions specifically set out in ‘The Problem of Social 
Cost’,51 themes which we regard as eccentric abnegations of his achievement, 
Coase hardly seemed to wish to effect such an alteration. Nevertheless, the 
first answer we would give to the question which forms the title of this article 
is, on the evidence of Coase’s treatment of Sturges v Bridgman as we have 
discussed it so far, very little. 
Simpson’s criticism of Coase’s handling of Sturges v Bridgman formed the 
basis of an argument that the Coase Theorem did not, could not, and should 
not form the basis of deciding nuisance cases. There were, in our opinion, 
three main points to this criticism: 
1 the Coase Theorem is ‘purely theoretical’;52 
 
 48 Ibid 35–7, quoting Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’, above n 2, 106. 
 49 See Coase, ‘Reply to Simpson’, above n 4, 109. 
 50 See ibid 103, quoting George J Stigler, ‘Does Economics Have a Useful Past?’ (1969) 1 History 
of Political Economy 217, 219. 
 51 Coase, ‘Reply to Simpson’, above n 4, 118. 
 52 Simpson, ‘The Story of Sturges v Bridgman’, above n 1, 18. See also at 18–19, 31–2. 
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2 deciding nuisance cases ‘does not’, as a matter of positive law, ‘entail 
attempting to reach an economically efficient solution’;53 and 
3 as a matter of normative law and economics, solving nuisance cases by 
means of Coasean bargaining would be ‘offensive’.54 
The first, but only the first, thing that must be said is that no one has 
pressed the point about the purely theoretical nature of the Coase Theorem 
more than Coase himself, and in what follows we will explore the implications 
of this. So completely did Simpson, as Coase alleged in his reply, misunder-
stand Coase’s theoretical views that he rested his positive and normative 
arguments about the law of nuisance upon criticism of the Coase Theorem, 
with the result that those arguments are much inferior to positive and 
normative arguments about that law derived from Coase himself. In this 
sense, the answer to the question that forms the title of this article is: yes, a 
very great deal, far more, in fact, than one of the greatest post-war academic 
lawyers. But before turning in Part VI of this article to how this paradoxical 
state of affairs could arise, we would like to say a little more about the nature 
of Coase’s legal historical mistakes in his discussion of Sturges v Bridgman. 
IV  A N  EX P L A NAT IO N  O F  COA S E ’ S  A C C O U N T 
O F  S T U R G E S  V  BR I D G M A N  
An evaluation of Simpson’s criticisms can helpfully begin by asking why 
Coase relied on Sturges v Bridgman to the extent he did in ‘The Federal 
Communications Commission’ and ‘The Problem of Social Cost’. One needs 
to bear in mind that Coase’s chief concern in the former article was not with 
harmful side effects. Though he addressed the then general belief that 
broadcasting interference was a side effect which necessitated government 
allocation, his main concern, as a specialist on the economics of public 
utilities in general and broadcasting in particular, was to establish that 
broadcasting frequencies should be allocated, not by administrative fiat, but 
through market-based solutions.55 His strategy for establishing this point was 
devastatingly simple: rather than arguing directly why a market-based 
solution was superior, he sought to demonstrate that the question of allocat-
ing resources for the purpose of broadcasting was not different in kind from 
 
 53 Ibid 32–3. 
 54 Ibid 40. The detail of Simpson’s criticism is discussed below in Part VI. 
 55 See Coase, ‘The Federal Communications Commission’, above n 14, 25–6. 
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questions of how to allocate economic resources in general. He argued that, 
given that in the United States economy answers to such questions generally 
were entrusted to markets, the same should obtain in the broadcasting sector. 
Rights in frequencies are not different in kind from, for example, rights in 
land, and once established they allow for the market mechanism to operate in 
quite the same way as it does in the case of real estate. Broadcasting interfer-
ence could be effectively regulated by the creation of private rights of exclusive 
use in frequencies, just as ownership of land regulates potential conflicting 
uses of land.56 It was considerations like this which led Coase to consider an 
actual land use case as a key illustration for his overall argument in ‘The 
Federal Communications Commission’. 
But why Sturges v Bridgman? Though we have made no detailed inquiry 
into this,57 Sturges v Bridgman certainly was regarded as a significant case 
when it was heard. We assume this played some part in its being placed on the 
list of the Master of the Rolls, Sir George Jessel, one of the limited number of 
High Court judgments given by the Master of the Rolls in the brief period 
between the passage of the Judicature Acts58 and it being decided that the 
Master of the Rolls’ caseload should be entirely appellate.59 The case was 
thought sufficiently important to be reported, not only in The Law Reports, 
but in four other series of reports60 and in The Times of London.61 As Simpson 
tells us,62 it was also noted in a medical professional journal.63 But Coase, we 
 
 56 Ibid. 
 57 Though Simpson uncovered material of very considerable interest (and, characteristically of 
him, considerable amusement value) about Sturges v Bridgman, he did not provide a com-
prehensive account of the contemporary or later legal doctrinal significance of the case in the 
way he usually did. The significance the case had for him was that Coase had so heavily relied 
on it. Simpson may therefore have gone too far when he claimed that he had provided ‘a very 
full account’ of the case, for he did not really undertake the searching ‘legal archaeological’ 
inquiry of the sort that has become so identified with him that it is widely called ‘doing a 
Simpson’: Simpson, ‘The Story of Sturges v Bridgman’, above n 1, 10; see also Michael Taggart, 
Private Property and Abuse of Rights in Victorian England (Oxford University Press, 2002) xi, 
195 n 1. But his focus was never on Sturges v Bridgman so much as on Coase. 
 58 See Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1873, 36 & 37 Vict, c 66; Supreme Court of Judicature 
Act 1875, 38 & 39 Vict, c 77 (‘Judicature Acts’). 
 59 Professor Polden describes the creation and operation of the modern Chancery Division under 
the Judicature Acts: Patrick Polden, ‘The Chancery Division’ in Sir John Baker (ed), The Oxford 
History of the Laws of England (Oxford University Press, 2010) vol XI, pt 3 s X, 832. 
 60 (1879) 43 JP 716; (1879) 48 LJ Ch 785, (1879) 28 WR 200; (1879) 41 LT NS 219. 
 61 In the High Court: ‘Sturges v Bridgman’, The Times (London), 4 June 1878, 4; in the Court of 
Appeal: ‘Sturges v Bridgman’, The Times (London), 2 July 1879, 6. 
 62 Simpson, ‘The Story of Sturges v Bridgman’, above n 1, 11 n 9. Simpson wrongly gives the date 
of the article as 20 July 1878. 
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have no doubt, did not properly know and would not have been concerned 
about the detailed contemporary or historical legal significance of the case 
and we strongly suspect that he came to it, as so many practising and 
academic lawyers, not to speak of economists and social theorists, often do, 
because he saw it cited in a textbook as authority for a legal proposition he 
thought interesting. 
Sturges v Bridgman is still routinely cited in English secondary authorities 
in connection with a number of propositions in land law and the law of 
nuisance,64 and Thesiger LJ’s observation that ‘what would be a nuisance in 
Belgrave Square would not necessarily be so in Bermondsey’65 is now so 
widely recognised as almost to have attained within the Commonwealth the 
status of a legal maxim. Though again we have made no detailed inquiry into 
the matter, Sturges v Bridgman undoubtedly had attained something like this 
status by 1929,66 the year in which Coase began his undergraduate studies for 
 
 63 ‘Quiet Consulting Rooms’, The Medical Times and Gazette (London), 8 June 1878, 623: ‘A case 
of considerable interest to the profession’. This account of the judgment in the Chancery 
Division is far more accurate than most accounts in law textbooks. 
 64 It is cited five times in Halsbury’s in relation to nuisance: LexisNexis, Halsbury’s Laws of 
England, vol 78 (at 13 January 2016) Nuisance, ‘1 Scope of Nuisance’ [110], [125]; ‘2 Legal 
Proceedings and Defences’ [193], [198]; ‘3 Remedies’ [231]. It is also cited in the statement of 
the law of commons in relation to the doctrine of lost modern grant: at vol 13 (at 13 January 
2016) Commons, ‘2 Rights of Common and Related Rights’ [472]. 
 65 Sturges v Bridgman (1879) 11 Ch D 852, 865. This was a hypothetical example unrelated to 
the actual case, for, although Wigmore Street and Wimpole Street are both now part of a very 
expensive professional use and residential neighbourhood, they were then quite different 
from Belgrave Square (though Wigmore Street more so than Wimpole Street) — and, to a 
smaller degree, they remain so as Belgravia, the area around Belgrave Square (the Square 
itself now being largely occupied by foreign embassies), must be one of the most expensive 
residential neighbourhoods in the world. The disappearance of industrial use from Ber-
mondsey makes the hypothetical comparison now entirely inapt. In fact it appears that Mr 
Bridgman’s and Dr Sturges’ premises are both now being used, not as a confectionary or even 
a doctor’s consulting rooms, but as the offices of firms of solicitors. We are grateful to Profes-
sor Stephen Littlechild for drawing this evidence of the changing use of Wigmore Street and 
Wimpole Street to our attention. 
 66 Sturges v Bridgman was cited 16 times in the Halsbury’s in use when Coase was an under-
graduate: Lord Halsbury (ed), Laws of England: Being a Complete Statement of the Whole Law 
of England (Butterworth, 1907–17) vol 4, 487 n (l); at vol 11, 240 n (d), 241 n (e), 259 n (g), 
261 n (m), 262 nn (r)–(t), (c), 264 n (u), 266 n (l), 271 n (k), 272 n (a), 302 n (r), 328 n (s); at 
vol 21, 509 n (l), 531 n (q), 532 n (b), 563 n (q). It would be tedious and of very limited value 
to list here all the references to Sturges v Bridgman in important English torts textbooks at the 
time of Coase’s studies. Of the three such textbooks which Coase cited in ‘The Problem of 
Social Cost’, only one had been written when Coase was an undergraduate, and Sturges v 
Bridgman is cited four times in that text: W T S Stallybrass, The Law of Torts: A Treatise on 
the English Law of Liability for Civil Injuries — by Sir John Salmond (Sweet & Maxwell, 7th ed, 
1928) 257–8 n (e), 261, 264 n (e), 268–9. Sturges v Bridgman is also cited four times in the 
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his Bachelor of Commerce degree at the London School of Economics.67 
Coase has himself said68 he was led to cases such as Sturges v Bridgman in the 
course of these studies. We have consulted the London School of Economics 
calendars for the years 1929–30 which contain the syllabuses and reading 
lists for the subjects which Coase read for his degree,69 which may be identi-
fied from his academic record which we have also consulted. These 
calendars lead one to think that Coase would not have made any detailed 
study of the law of tort but would have studied it to the extent necessary to 
come to terms with commercial subjects, especially regarding negligence in 
connection with what would now be called employment law and compensa-
tion for industrial injury.70 But this study was not at all profound even in 
regard of tort in general and, in respect of nuisance, Coase’s studies no doubt 
were rudimentary. 
Coase evidently learned how to find at least some cases in the law reports 
during his undergraduate studies,71 and he did actually consult the reports of 
Sturges v Bridgman and the other cases discussed in Part V (and also in Part 
VII) of ‘The Problem of Social Cost’,72 — but he would have done so with very 
limited training at best in the use of primary legal sources, and those cases, 
including Sturges v Bridgman, are difficult cases. As we have said, Coase made 
 
current edition, which is badly out of date: R F V Heuston and R A Buckley, Salmond and 
Heuston on the Law of Torts (Sweet & Maxwell, 21st ed, 1996) 58, 61 n 84, 70 n 64, 75–6. 
 67 Ronald H Coase, ‘Ronald H Coase’ in William Breit and Barry T Hirsch (eds), Lives of the 
Laureates: Twenty-Three Nobel Economists (MIT Press, 5th ed, 2009) 189, 192. 
 68 Ronald Coase, ‘The 17th Annual Coase Lecture’ (Speech delivered at the University of 
Chicago Law School, Chicago, 1 April 2003) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yqT6ko 
FnEwA#t=5m46s>. 
 69 We have also consulted the calendar for 1931–32, the year in which, but for the award of the 
scholarship which allowed him to undertake the travel in the United States — which had 
such an effect on the thinking that led to ‘The Nature of the Firm’: R H Coase, ‘The Nature of 
the Firm’ in The Firm, the Market, and the Law (University of Chicago Press, 1988) 33 — 
Coase would have undertaken further studies. This would have led to the award of a different 
degree with more legal content and, in Coase’s own view, would ‘undoubtedly’ have led to 
his becoming a lawyer: Coase, ‘Ronald H Coase’, above n 67, 192. 
 70 See Coase, ‘The 17th Annual Coase Lecture’, above n 68. The result of Coase’s studies in these 
specific areas, parallel in significance but rather better on the law, is the treatment of ‘the 
directions of an entrepreneur’: Coase, ‘The Nature of the Firm’, above n 69, 39. 
 71 Coase, ‘Ronald H Coase’, above n 67, 200. It may have been misleading for Coase to claim to 
have obtained a ‘familiarity’ with the law reports as a result of his studies, but, of course, this 
is all relative, and by any standard other than the lawyer’s own, he did have such a familiarity. 
The sometimes daunting difficulties of searching the various reports have, of course, largely 
been eliminated in these days of computerised research, but Sturges v Bridgman would have 
been quite an easy case to find by the old technique of going to a library shelf. 
 72 Ibid 201. 
18 Melbourne University Law Review [Vol 39(3):Adv 
Advance Copy 
no pretension to ability in legal scholarship, and his discussion of Sturges v 
Bridgman as we have examined it so far would lead one to think he was wise 
not to do so. We nevertheless cannot but feel that Simpson has been some-
what parochial and extremely uncharitable about all this. To purport to 
actually discuss legal cases in detail in an article of the nature of ‘The Problem 
of Social Cost’ as Coase did was an extraordinary thing for an economist to 
do in 1960. More importantly than leaving oneself open to possible exposure 
of error by lawyers, one certainly courted flat incomprehension or rejection 
by economists, and this is what overwhelmingly happened to Coase’s (other 
than purely theoretical) argument for more than two decades after his article 
was published. 
The story of how Coase defended his analysis as he had first formulated it 
in ‘The Federal Communications Commission’ before some of the faculty of 
the Department of Economics at The University of Chicago, and how this led 
to his being invited to write up the argument more fully in the form it 
eventually took in ‘The Problem of Social Cost’, is too well known to need 
rehearsing here.73 But this important instance of Coase persuading an initially 
sceptical audience of economists is an exception that proves a rule. Much 
more typical of the reception of ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ was Arrow and 
Scitovsky’s decision not to include it in the third part, headed ‘Social versus 
Private Costs and Benefits’, of the collection of essays on welfare economics 
published in 1969 as vol XII of the American Economic Association’s very 
prestigious Series of Republished Articles on Economics. ‘[U]nfortunately’, 
Arrow and Scitovsky wrote, Coase’s article ‘with its many legal examples, was 
too long for inclusion’.74 We ourselves think that Coase took an enormously 
bold step in giving reported cases such prominence in ‘The Problem of Social 
Cost’, for which Simpson does not give him any credit, and, amazing to say, 
for which we do not think he has since generally received sufficient credit. 
The enormous credit Coase has received for work in the vein of ‘The Prob-
lem of Social Cost’ has largely been for advocating the Coase Theorem as a 
guide to practical policy.75 Although Coase stressed that the government, the 
 
 73 See generally Coase, ‘Reply to Simpson’, above n 4, 107. 
 74 Kenneth J Arrow and Tibor Scitovsky (eds), Readings in Welfare Economics (George Allen 
and Unwin, 1969) 183–4. 
 75 After it had been rescued from obscurity, the way ‘The Nature of the Firm’ has influenced 
discussion of industrial organisation has much more commonly been based on an essentially 
accurate interpretation of Coase’s actual argument in that article. It is, however, a puzzle that 
Coase did not comment on the way that the ‘agency theory’ of the firm, to which economists 
he admired made major contributions, completely contradicts his views. 
2016] What Did Ronald Coase Know about the Law of Tort? 19 
Advance Copy 
‘custodian of [the] frequencies’,76 should have an essential role in ‘[t]he 
creation of … rights in the use of frequencies’,77 it is fair to say that Coase did 
have something like the Coase Theorem in mind as the impulse for his plea 
for replacing administrative allocation of broadcasting frequencies by 
government with a market-based solution. But in ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ 
his arguments were expressed in a much more nuanced fashion as a result of 
his explicit consideration of the effect of transaction costs on the results of his 
analysis.78 There is thus more than a little to his repeated complaints that his 
‘point of view has not in general commanded assent, nor has my argument, 
for the most part, been understood’: 
The extensive discussion [of ‘The Problem of Social Cost’] in the journals has 
concentrated almost entirely on the ‘Coase Theorem,’ a proposition about the 
world of zero transaction costs. This response, though disappointing, is under-
standable. The world of zero transaction costs, to which the Coase Theorem ap-
plies, is the world of modern economic analysis, and economists therefore feel 
quite comfortable handling the intellectual problems it poses, remote from the 
real world though they may be. … [I]f I am right, current economic analysis is 
incapable of handling many of the problems to which it purports to give an-
swers. … [D]iscussion of the Coase Theorem is … but a preliminary to the de-
velopment of an analytical system capable of tackling the problems posed by 
the real world of positive transaction costs.79 
In sum, ‘[t]he world of zero transaction costs has often been described as 
a Coasean world. Nothing could be further from the truth. It is the world 
of modern economic theory, one which I was hoping to persuade economists 
to leave’.80 
 
 76 Coase, ‘The Federal Communications Commission’, above n 14, 21. 
 77 Ibid 25–6. 
 78 M Klaes, ‘Transaction Costs, History of’ in Steven N Durlauf and Lawrence E Blume (eds), 
The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics (Palgrave Macmillan, 2nd ed, 2008) vol 8, 364. 
 79 R H Coase, ‘The Firm, the Market and the Law’ in R H Coase (ed), The Firm, the Market, and 
the Law (University of Chicago Press, 1988) 1, 1, 15. 
 80 Coase, ‘Notes on the Problem of Social Cost’, above n 19, 174. We have taken quotations from 
materials potentially available to Simpson in 1996. Coase’s later rejections of the Coase Theo-
rem were often even more strongly stated. For example, in a 2012 interview he said ‘I never 
liked “the Coase Theorem” … I don’t like it because it’s a proposition about a system in which 
there were no transaction costs. It’s a system which couldn’t exist. And therefore it’s quite 
unimaginable’: Russ Roberts, Interview with Ronald Coase (Podcast Interview, 8 May 2012) 
<http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2012/05/coase_on_extern.html>. 
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Most economists, lawyers and social theorists still hold to Simpson’s repre-
sentative position that Coase believed that the Coase Theorem could be a 
guide to practical policy. That Coase gave some sanction for this in the way he 
himself treated cases such as Sturges v Bridgman in ‘The Problem of Social 
Cost’ does not absolve those who remain wedded to such a restricted and 
simplistic reading of the article, but we shall now try to assess the extent to 
which Coase gave them a warrant for this. 
V  T H E  T H E O R E T I C A L  SH O RT C O M I N G S  A N D  T H E  T H E O R E T IC A L  
V A LU E  O F  COA S E ’ S  AC C O U N T 
A  Where Coase Went Quite Wrong 
It can hardly be denied that ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ is a poorly organised 
article and we wish to argue here that this poor organisation has played a 
considerable part in the widespread misunderstanding of its argument. It will 
be recalled that Sturges v Bridgman was one of four ‘actual’ cases discussed in 
Part V of ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ in order to ‘clarify’ and ‘illustrate’ 
the previous argument which had set up what has come to be known as the 
Coase Theorem. But however laudable Coase’s wish to relate this theoretical 
argument to actual cases, to bring these cases in at this point was rather 
ill-advised, for, because they are actual cases, the last thing one could say 
about them is that they illustrate what would happen at zero transaction 
costs, which is the assumption on which Coase proceeds in Part V. As 
Simpson put it: 
Let us now turn from economic theory to the mundane world of legal decision, 
as exemplified in the story of Sturges v Bridgman. … [T]he issue in the case, as 
seen by Sir George Jessel, had nothing whatever to do with the question — 
‘whether the continued use of the machinery adds more to the confectioner’s 
income than it subtracts from the doctor’s’.81 
Coase, it must be said, principally got around this difficulty in Part V by 
talking about bargaining which simply did not happen in the reported case 
and which certainly did not form part of its ratio.82 In mitigation of what 
Coase did, one could say that he succumbed here to a typical methodological 
strategy of the economist: that of the hypothetical thought experiment. Once 
 
 81 Simpson, ‘The Story of Sturges v Bridgman’, above n 1, 29, 35, quoting Coase, ‘The Problem of 
Social Cost’, above n 2, 106. 
 82 See below n 189. 
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economists have established the key features of an economic setting, they will 
often then consider variations in those features, and this seems to underlie 
Coase’s procedure when he recast Sturges v Bridgman in a hypothetical 
bilateral bargaining setting which conveniently abstracts from any complexi-
ties arising in a world of positive transaction costs. 
Ironically, Sturges v Bridgman was, as we have mentioned, an early case 
heard in the English civil courts reformed under the Judicature Acts — passed, 
of course, in response to public disgust at the delay, error and expense of the 
civil legal process so memorably condemned by Charles Dickens in Bleak 
House.83 But nevertheless, as Simpson repeatedly insisted, litigation such as 
Sturges v Bridgman was ‘very expensive,’ and ‘[g]iven the costs of litigation’,84 
to use such a process to illustrate an economically efficient bilateral bargaining 
solution was, as we have said, rather ill-advised, for it was bound to mislead. 
Even though it might be allowed that his overall intentions are clear, one 
cannot but level at Coase’s use of Sturges v Bridgman (and the other cases in 
Part V) the criticism he himself famously levelled at those economists who 
had used the lighthouse as an illustration of the argument for public goods: 
the illustration serves only ‘to provide “corroborative detail, intended to give 
artistic verisimilitude to an otherwise bald and unconvincing narrative”’.85 
Coase began Part VI, headed ‘The Cost of Market Transactions Taken into 
Account’, by saying that 
 
 83 See, eg, Charles Dickens, Bleak House (Penguin, 1985). 
 84 Simpson, ‘The Story of Sturges v Bridgman’, above n 1, 19 n 25; see also at 30–1. 
 85 R H Coase, ‘The Lighthouse in Economics’ in The Firm, The Market, and the Law (University 
of Chicago Press, 1988) 187, 211. Coase was borrowing a line from W S Gilbert’s libretto for 
The Mikado: see, eg, W S Gilbert, The Mikado in Ian Bradley (ed), The Complete Annotated 
Gilbert and Sullivan (Oxford University Press, 1996) 551, 635. This article has itself been 
criticised for not getting the relevant facts right: Elodie Bertrand, ‘The Coasean Analysis of 
Lighthouse Financing: Myths and Realities’ (2006) 30 Cambridge Journal of Economics 389, 
390. Coase’s work is at the moment being subjected to a general criticism in this regard since 
his overall aim when applying empirical argument was in most cases illustrative rather than 
systematic, and in many instances was based on selective reference to secondary literature or 
official material. Those parts of his work that result from specialist, in-depth study of the 
relevant empirical context, — his outstanding specialism was the broadcasting industry in 
general and the British Broadcasting Corporation in particular — do seem to have stood the 
test of time: R H Coase, British Broadcasting: A Study in Monopoly (Longmans, Green, 1950). 
See also Richard Collins and Zoe Sujon, ‘UK Broadcasting Policy: The “Long Wave” Shift in 
Conceptions of Accountability’ in Paolo Baldi and Uwe Hasebrink (eds), Broadcasters and 
Citizens in Europe: Trends in Media Accountability and Viewer Participation (Intellect, 2007) 
33, 41–2; Andrea Prat and David Strömberg, ‘The Political Economy of Mass Media’ in Da-
ron Acemoglu, Manuel Arellano and Eddie Dekel (eds), Advances in Economics and Econo-
metrics — Tenth World Congress, Volume II: Applied Economics (Cambridge University Press, 
2013) 135, 181 n 19. 
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[t]he argument has proceeded up to this point on the assumption (explicit in 
[Parts] III and IV and tacit in [Part] V) that there were no costs involved in car-
rying out market transactions. This is of course a very unrealistic assumption.86 
Part VI then proceeded on the basis of positive transaction costs, when, as we 
shall see 
[t]he same approach which, with zero transaction costs, demonstrates that the 
allocation of resources remains the same whatever the legal position, also 
shows that, with positive transaction costs, the law plays a crucial role in de-
termining how resources are used.87 
In Part VII, headed ‘The Legal Delimitation of Rights and the Economic 
Problem’, Coase sought to show how, when transaction costs were positive, 
decisions were reached in a number of actual cases, and we argue that he was 
theoretically right about this. The opportunity surely was there to contrast 
how cases would have been decided at zero transaction costs in Part V 
(illustrative of Parts III and IV) with how they were decided when transaction 
costs were positive in Part VII (illustrative of Part VI). 
But of the four cases discussed in Part V, Coase returns only to Sturges v 
Bridgman in Part VII,88 and the contrast does not at all emerge between its 
treatment there (when transaction costs are positive) and in Part V (when 
transaction costs are zero). This was for two very good reasons. First, as we 
have examined it so far, the initial account Coase gave of the case in Part V 
was entirely made-up, in line with his use of the case as a hypothetical, 
although any fair reading would take what Coase said to be an account of 
what actually happened in the case. Secondly, when Coase did turn to the 
 
 86 Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’, above n 2, 114. 
 87 Coase, ‘Notes on the Problem of Social Cost’, above n 19, 178. The most succinct statement of 
his actual position can be found in his Nobel Lecture, Coase, Essays on Economics and Econ-
omists, above n 19, 11: 
If we move from a regime of zero transaction costs to one of positive transaction costs, 
what becomes immediately clear is the crucial importance of the legal system in this new 
world. … While we can imagine in the hypothetical world of zero transaction costs that 
the parties to an exchange would negotiate to change any provision of the law which pre-
vents them from taking whatever steps are required to increase the value of production, 
in the real world of positive transaction costs such a procedure would be extremely costly 
and would make unprofitable, even where it was allowed, a great deal of such contracting 
around the law. Because of this, the rights which individuals possess, with their duties 
and privileges, will be, to a large extent, what the law determines. As a result, the legal 
system will have a profound effect on the working of the economic system and may in 
certain respects be said to control it. 
 88 Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’, above n 2, 122–3. 
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actual decision in Sturges v Bridgman in Part V, at the end of the longer, 
second paragraph of his discussion of the case, he anticipated what he should 
have said, but only very briefly and unsatisfactorily did say, in Part VI, when 
that material simply does not belong in Part V. Coase no doubt was right to 
complain of the very pronounced focus on Parts III and IV, and corollary 
neglect of ‘other aspects of the analysis’ in commentary on ‘The Problem of 
Social Cost’,89 but it must be said he invited it. What he did was path breaking, 
but it was also very confusing. Much subsequent work of reinterpretation has 
been required to dispel this confusion. But in the course of this work, many 
commentators have actually moved away from the bargaining framework for 
economics fundamentally offered by Coase, and it is in this sense that we here 
seek to, as it were, complete this reinterpretation by relating it back to the 
detail of the argument of ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ itself. 
B   Where Coase Was Very Right 
If, as Simpson was right to claim, the parties in Sturges v Bridgman and the 
judges hearing the case understood it as a case of a clash of incompatible 
unqualified property rights, then one is obliged to ask why and how that clash 
was resolved in the doctor’s favour. As we have seen, the principal legal 
question actually addressed in the case was, it being immediately taken the 
confectioner was causing a nuisance, whether he had acquired a prescriptive 
right to do so, and it was decided that, despite the confectioner having long 
used the machinery in the way of which the doctor complained, he had not. 
Continuing to put the common law and Prescription Act 1832 to one side, we 
want to address the vital question which surely arises for the understanding of 
the case and for understanding the doctrinal and theoretical issues in the law 
of nuisance which underpin it: why was it believed to be so obvious that the 
confectioner was committing a nuisance? 
To the layperson and to students first coming to the case, the very peculiar 
feature of Sturges v Bridgman is that, though the confectioner was liable, it was 
the doctor who, in the view of the layperson and the neophyte, caused the 
nuisance. The confectioner (and his father) had carried out the same business 
on the same premises for more than 60 years and had been using the machin-
ery in the way of which the doctor complained for 26 years prior to the 
litigation.90 It was only when in 1873, five years before the matter reached the 
 
 89 Coase, ‘The Firm, the Market and the Law’, above n 79, 13. 
 90 Sturges v Bridgman (1879) 11 Ch D 852, 853–4. Simpson, ‘The Story of Sturges v Bridgman’, 
above n 1, 1114, helpfully gave previously unknown concrete details of this aspect of the case, 
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Chancery Division, the doctor built the consulting room, one of the walls of 
which was a party-wall with the confectioner, that the nuisance arose.91 The 
wall was built to normal standards, but being a party-wall it very effectively 
transmitted the noise and vibration. Tort students typically struggle to 
appreciate how the doctor was able to, as they initially see it, cause the 
problem and yet the confectioner be held liable for the nuisance. 
Sturges v Bridgman is now mainly known as authority for the paradoxical 
proposition that a plaintiff can ‘move (or come) to a nuisance’. This possibility 
arises from the nature of the modern law of private nuisance. That law does 
not prevent ‘interference’ with the enjoyment of land. It prevents ‘unreasona-
ble’ interference with such enjoyment.92 This, of course, makes determining 
whether the interference, and the use that gives rise to the interference, is 
reasonable or unreasonable central to the tort. The modern law of nuisance is 
not a matter of unqualified property rights, but rather is wholly contingent.93 
The legal history of the emergence of the modern law of nuisance has been 
most informatively described in celebrated articles by Professors Brenner and 
McLaren94 as a process by which distance was taken from the maxim sic utere 
 
of which torts scholars (and Coase) had been only generally aware from the reporter’s state-
ment of the facts: see also Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’, above n 2, 105. In particular, 
Dr Sturges only began to lease the premises in 1865, and lived and conducted his profession 
there without any problem until he built the consulting room eight years after moving in. 
 91 Sturges v Bridgman (1879) 11 Ch D 852, 853, 855 (Jessel MR). 
 92 See Donald Harris, David Campbell and Roger Halson, Remedies in Contract and Tort 
(Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed, 2005) 465–8. 
 93 David Campbell, ‘Of Coase and Corn: A (Sort of) Defence of Private Nuisance’ (2000) 63 
Modern Law Review 197, 203. 
 94 Joel Franklin Brenner, ‘Nuisance Law and the Industrial Revolution’ (1974) 3 Journal of Legal 
Studies 403; John P S McLaren, ‘Nuisance Law and the Industrial Revolution — Some Les-
sons from Social History’ (1983) 3 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 155. See also Ben Pontin, 
‘Tort Law and Victorian Government Growth: The Historiographical Significance of Tort in 
the Shadow of Chemical Pollution and Factory Safety Regulation’ (1998) 18 Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies 661; Noga Morag-Levine, Chasing the Wind: Regulating Air Pollution in the 
Common Law State (Princeton University Press, 2003) ch 3. In his more recent work, Pontin 
has sought to revisit the issue of the relative importance of the substance of, and of access to, 
the law raised by Brenner and McLaren. Despite its great interest, the only brief discussion of 
Simpson in these works renders it somewhat tangential to the core issues we wish to discuss: 
see Ben Pontin, ‘Integrated Pollution Control in Victorian Britain: Rethinking Progress 
within the History of Environmental Law’ (2007) 19 Journal of Environmental Law 173; 
B Pontin, ‘The Secret Achievements of Nineteenth Century Nuisance Law: Attorney-General 
v Birmingham Corporation (1858–95) in Context’ (2007) 19 Environmental Law and Man-
agement 271; Ben Pontin, ‘Tipping v St Helens Smelting (1865): “Anti-development” or “Sus-
tainable Development”?’ (2007) 19 Environmental Law and Management 157; Ben Pontin, 
‘Nuisance Law and the Industrial Revolution: A Reinterpretation of Doctrine and Institu-
tional Competence’ (2012) 75 Modern Law Review 1010, 1022 n 68; Ben Pontin, ‘The Com-
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tuo ut alienum non laedas,95 under which the defendant was subject to strict, if 
not absolute,96 liability for any interference. Liability depends on ‘what is 
reasonable [use] according to the ordinary usages of mankind living in  a 
particular society’97 and ‘is a matter of balancing the conflicting interests of 
the two neighbours’.98 Under the ‘rule of give and take’,99 occupiers must 
accept as much interference with each other’s enjoyment as is reasonable in 
the neighbourhood in question. 
The principal reason given for why nuisance liability has come to be decid-
ed on a give and take basis rather than by adherence to the sic utere maxim is 
that the latter would hinder or even prevent economic growth. The spirit of 
the ‘reasonable use’ at the core of the English law of private nuisance is as it 
was expressed in 1858 in Hole v Barlow: 
It is not every body whose enjoyment of life and property is rendered uncom-
fortable by the carrying on of an offensive or noxious trade in the neighbour-
hood, that can bring an action. If that were so, … the … great manufacturing 
towns of England would be full of persons bringing actions for nuisances aris-
ing from the carrying on of noxious or offensive trades in their vicinity, to the 
great injury of the manufacturing and social interests of the community.100 
 
mon Law Clean Up of the “Workshop of the World”: More Realism about Nuisance Law’s 
Historic Environmental Achievements’ (2013) 40 Journal of Law and Society 173, 174 nn 5–6; 
Ben Pontin, Nuisance Law and Environmental Protection: A Study of Nuisance Injunctions in 
Practice (Lawtext Publishing, 2013) 68, 83, 92–5; A W Brian Simpson, Leading Cases in the 
Common Law (Oxford University Press, 1995) 163 (‘Leading Cases’). See also below nn 123–3 
and accompanying text. See generally Leslie Rosenthal, The River Pollution Dilemma in Victo-
rian England: Nuisance Law versus Economic Efficiency (Ashgate, 2014). 
 95 R H Kersley, A Selection of Legal Maxims: Classified and Illustrated — by Herbert Broom 
(Sweet & Maxwell, 10th ed, 1939) 238: ‘enjoy your own property in such a manner as not to 
injure that of another person’. 
 96 A very great deal of what one does on one’s own land can be shown by the standards of the 
physical sciences to ‘interfere’ with neighbouring land, but the sic utere rule did not, of 
course, turn on these standards. The law of nuisance has always in part distinguished reason-
able and unreasonable interference by regarding some interference as de minimis or, perhaps 
part of the same idea, so much an inevitable, and practically irremediable, part of social 
coexistence as to be damnum sine injuria: ‘injury with no condemnation [damages]’. This is 
the background to the difficulty of Coase’s reference to the ancient windmill case, which 
seems to turn on obstruction of the general flow of wind: Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’, 
above n 2, 121, citing Bowles, above n 15, 238 n 6. 
 97 Sedleigh-Denfield v O’Callaghan [1940] AC 880, 903 (Wright LJ). 
 98 Miller v Jackson [1977] 1 QB 966, 981 (Lord Denning MR). 
 99 Bamford v Turnley (1862) 3 B and S 66, 84; 122 ER 27, 33. (Williams J for the Court). 
 100 (1858) 4 CB NS 334, 335; 140 ER 1113, 1114 (Byles J). As in Sturges v Bridgman, Belgrave 
Square is given as a hypothetical example of a neighbourhood where industrial use unargua-
 
26 Melbourne University Law Review [Vol 39(3):Adv 
Advance Copy 
By broadly regarding industrial pollution as reasonable interference, the law 
of private nuisance made, it is argued, industrialisation possible. 
Sturges v Bridgman illustrates the contingent nature of private nuisance 
particularly well. In what had been a manufacturing neighbourhood but was 
at the time of the case an ‘improving’ neighbourhood becoming dominated by 
professional practices and concomitant residential use,101 noise and vibration 
such as was being caused by the confectioner was a nuisance. If that noise and 
vibration had been caused in a neighbourhood dominated by manufacturing 
use and thought to have no other prospect, it would not have been a nuisance. 
This is the gist of the famous dictum we have already quoted that ‘what would 
be a nuisance in Belgrave Square would not necessarily be so in Bermond-
sey’.102 The particular difficulty arises, however, that neighbourhoods do not 
remain of the same character. A court faced with possible changing use must 
in effect decide which use is most valuable in order to decide whether there is 
a nuisance. 
Though, as we have said, there is no actual discussion of why the confec-
tioner’s use was regarded as a nuisance, the Belgrave Square hypothetical 
example sheds light on why this was so readily taken to be the case. Thesi-
ger LJ considered the confectioner’s argument that if the refusal to find that 
the confectioner’s use gave rise to a prescriptive right: 
were carried out to its logical consequences, it would result in the most serious 
practical inconveniences, for a man might go — say into the midst of the tan-
neries of Bermondsey, or into any other locality devoted to a particular trade or 
manufacture of a noisy or unsavoury character, and, by building a private resi-
dence upon a vacant piece of land, put a stop to such trade or manufacture al-
together. The case also is put of a blacksmith’s forge built away from all habita-
tions, but to which, in course of time, habitations approach.103 
 
bly would be a nuisance. Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’, above n 2, 121 n 18, cites A-G 
ex rel Gray’s Inn Society v Doughty (1752) 2 Ves Sen 453; 28 ER 290 and gives as a United 
States comparison the obscurely reported but nevertheless well-known dictum of Mus-
manno J in Versailles Borough v McKeesport Coal and Coke Co, 83 Pittsburgh Legal Journal 
379, 385 (Allegheny County Ct Com Pl, 1935): ‘Without smoke, Pittsburgh would have 
remained a very pretty village’. Finding for the defendant smoke emitter, Musmanno J con-
soled the plaintiffs with the observation that ‘it is probable that upon reflection they will, in 
spite of the annoyance which they suffer, still conclude that, after all, one’s bread is more 
important than landscape or clear skies’: Morag-Levine, above n 94, 95 n 37. 
 101 See generally Simpson, ‘The Story of Sturges v Bridgman’, above n 1, 12–13. 
 102 Sturges v Bridgman (1879) 11 Ch D 852, 865 (Thesiger LJ for the Court). 
 103 Ibid. 
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To this Thesiger LJ responded: 
We do not think that either of these hypothetical cases presents any real diffi-
culty. As regards the first, it may be answered that whether anything is a nui-
sance or not is a question to be determined, not merely by an abstract consider-
ation of the thing itself, but in reference to its circumstances; what would be a 
nuisance in Belgrave Square would not necessarily be so in Bermondsey; and 
where a locality is devoted to a particular trade or manufacture carried on by 
the traders or manufacturers in a particular and established manner not consti-
tuting a public nuisance, Judges and juries would be justified in finding, and 
may be trusted to find, that the trade or manufacture so carried on in that lo-
cality is not a private or actionable wrong. As regards the blacksmith’s forge, 
that is really an idem per idem case with the present. It would be on the one 
hand in a very high degree unreasonable and undesirable that there should be a 
right of action for acts which are not in the present condition of the adjoining 
land, and possibly never will be any annoyance or inconvenience to either its 
owner or occupier; and it would be on the other hand in an equally degree un-
just, and, from a public point of view, inexpedient that the use and value of the 
adjoining land should, for all time and under all circumstances, be restricted 
and diminished by reason of the continuance of acts incapable of physical in-
terruption, and which the law gives no power to prevent. The smith in the case 
supposed might protect himself by taking a sufficient curtilage to ensure what 
he does from being at any time an annoyance to his neighbour, but the neigh-
bour himself would be powerless in the matter. Individual cases of hardship 
may occur in the strict carrying out of the principle upon which we found our 
judgment, but the negation of the principle would lead even more to individual 
hardship, and would at the same time produce a prejudicial effect upon the de-
velopment of land for residential purposes.104 
When it is a question of a private resident moving into a neighbourhood it 
is believed will remain industrial, there is no nuisance. When it is a question 
of a blacksmith seeking to continue as a smith in an area thought to have 
prospects of becoming residential, there is a nuisance. When it is a question of 
a doctor moving into an industrial neighbourhood thought to have prospects 
 
 104 Ibid 865–6. Jessel MR had considered the blacksmith example, and his view was that the 
blacksmith should not be allowed effectively to prevent residential development when land 
‘which is useless as a barren moor becomes available for building land by reason of the 
growth of a neighbouring town’ because this would be to say ‘that the owner has lost the right 
to this barren moor, which has now become worth perhaps hundreds of thousands of 
pounds, by being unable to build upon it by reason of this noisy business?’: at 858–9. 
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of becoming one of professional use, there is a nuisance. To these possibilities 
considered in Sturges v Bridgman we should add the paradigm case that lies 
behind these other cases, of the industrial polluter beginning production in a 
formerly unpolluted neighbourhood but where industrial use is thought to be 
the future, when the industrial use and the interference by pollution will be 
found to be reasonable. It seems to us perfectly sensible for Coase to call this 
‘planning and zoning by the judiciary’,105 and we take it to be a measure of 
Simpson’s failure to grasp the fundamental issue that he dismissively criticises 
the idea that a ‘zoning’ problem was involved at all.106 
In ‘The Problem of Social Cost’, Coase refers to the passage from the Court 
of Appeal’s judgment we have just quoted as evidence that ‘the judges were 
thinking of the economic consequences of alternative decisions’.107 One must 
read this in the context of the general observation Coase makes that, though it 
‘would be of great interest’ to do so, he had ‘not been able’ to make ‘[a] 
thorough examination of the presuppositions of the courts in trying such 
cases’ — but that nevertheless his ‘cursory study’ had shown ‘that the courts 
have often recognised the economic implications of their decisions’, albeit that 
they ‘do not always refer very clearly to the economic problems posed by the 
cases brought before them’.108 Read in this context, his view of the nuisance 
aspect of Sturges v Bridgman is wonderfully penetrating. It is, in our opinion, 
not merely the best but the only basis of an explanation of the give and take 
basis of the modern law of nuisance in general: 
a comparison between the utility and harm produced is an element in deciding 
whether a harmful effect should be considered a nuisance. … [T]he courts, in 
cases relating to nuisance, are, in effect, making a decision on the economic 
problem and determining how resources are to be employed.109 
That this explanation needs to be restated in terms more conversant with 
the legal doctrines of nuisance seems almost a carping criticism when set next 
to the fact, a remarkable achievement by anyone, not merely one who made 
 
 105 Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’, above n 2, 123, quoting Charles M Haar, Land-Use 
Planning: A Casebook on the Use, Misuse and Re-use of Urban Land (Little, Brown, 1959) 95. 
Haar’s work contains this phrase in a chapter entitled ‘“Sic Utere Tuo …”: Reconciliation 
by the Judiciary of Discordant Land Uses’. See also Charles M Haar and Michael Allan 
Wolf, Land-Use Planning and the Environment: A Casebook (Environmental Law Institute, 
2010) ch 2. 
 106 Simpson, ‘The Story of Sturges v Bridgman’, above n 1, 12–13. See also at 22. 
 107 Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’, above n 2, 122. 
 108 Ibid 119–20, 123. 
 109 Ibid 120, 132–3. 
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no pretence to competence in legal scholarship, that it can be set out in such 
a way.110 
It will be recalled that in our earlier discussion of Coase’s treatment of 
Sturges v Bridgman in Part V of ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ we mentioned 
that Coase ended the first paragraph of that analysis, which purports to be of 
the actual argument in the case but is not, with an unattributed quotation 
from the Court of Appeal’s judgment. It is the concluding sentence of the long 
quotation just given.111 It will also be recalled that we also ended our discus-
sion of Coase’s analysis in Part V of the ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ before 
the end of its second paragraph, at the start of a passage we now quote in full: 
It was of course the view of the judges that they were affecting the working of 
the economic system — and in a desirable direction. Any other decision would 
have had ‘a prejudicial effect upon the development of land for residential pur-
poses,’ an argument which was elaborated by examining the example of a forge 
operating on a barren moor which was later developed for residential purposes. 
The judges’ view that they were settling how the land was to be used would be 
true only in the case in which the costs of carrying out the necessary market 
transactions exceeded the gain which might be achieved by any arrangement of 
rights. And it would be desirable to preserve the areas (Wimpole Street or the 
moor) for residential or professional use (by giving non-industrial users the 
right to stop the noise, vibration, smoke, etc., by injunction) only if the value of 
the additional residential facilities obtained was greater than the value of cakes 
or iron lost. But of this the judges seem to have been unaware.112 
As an analysis of the actual arguments which were, or might have been, 
made in the case, this is completely inaccurate. It had no business being made 
part of an account of Sturges v Bridgman. It had no business appearing in Part 
V at all because it is worse than useless as an illustration of the Coase Theo-
rem. But as an analysis of the background thinking that led the Courts to 
believe that the nuisance issue (which to the layperson and the neophyte is a 
 
 110 It is very instructive to compare the doctrinally superficial but theoretically profound 
discussion of the requirement that a nuisance be ‘substantial’ in Coase, ‘The Problem of 
Social Cost’, above n 2, 120–1, with the almost contemporaneous, but independently arrived 
at, doctrinally impeccable discussion of that requirement in Guido Calabresi, ‘Some 
Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts’ (1961) 70 Yale Law Journal 499, 534–40. 
See especially at 536–7. 
 111 Sturges v Bridgman (1879) 11 Ch D 852, 865–6 (Thesiger LJ); Coase, ‘The Problem of Social 
Cost’, above n 2, 105; above n 104 and accompanying text. 
 112 Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’, above n 2, 106–7. 
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particularly vexed one) was so straightforward that it needed no more than a 
gestural discussion, it is seminal. 
VI  A NA LYS I S  O F  T H E  DE TA I L  O F  S I M P S O N’ S  CR I T IC I S M 
Simpson, as we have seen, accepts none of this and we have argued above in 
Part IV that there are three main points to the criticism which leads him to 
refuse to do so. Let us consider each of these in turn. 
A  The Coase Theorem is ‘Purely Theoretical’ 
It is helpful here to juxtapose two passages expressing Simpson’s principal 
criticism of the Coase Theorem and Coase’s own views about that Theorem. 
Simpson wrote: 
the Coase Theorem … is of course a purely theoretical view as to what would 
happen in a world which does not exist. … Coasean cost benefit analysis bears 
no relationship at all to how neighbours behave in real life situations … It may 
be that in some imagined world some such analysis would take place, but law-
yers are concerned with the real world. Law involves practical reason. It is un-
clear to me what lawyers can learn from an imagined world. … [T]he whole 
idea of an ideally efficient solution is it itself, from a practical point of view, 
vacuous. … [W]hatever the theoretical utility of the ideal conception of eco-
nomic efficiency may be, it is devoid of empirical or practical significance. It is 
the crock of gold at the end of a rainbow.113 
And Coase wrote: 
The extensive discussion [of ‘The Problem of Social Cost’] in the journals has 
concentrated almost entirely on the ‘Coase Theorem,’ a proposition about the 
world of zero transaction costs. This response, though disappointing, is under-
standable. The world of zero transaction costs, to which the Coase Theorem ap-
plies, is the world of modern economic analysis, and economists therefore feel 
quite comfortable handling the intellectual problems it poses, remote from the 
real world though they may be. … [I]f I am right, current economic analysis is 
incapable of handling many of the problems to which it purports to give an-
swers. … [D]iscussion of the Coase Theorem is … but a preliminary to the de-
 
 113 Simpson, ‘The Story of Sturges v Bridgman’, above n 1, 18, 32, 40. 
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velopment of an analytical system capable of tackling the problems posed by 
the real world of positive transaction costs.114 
Though it understandably drew a rebuke from Simpson, as the complaint 
should have been better put,115 we think Coase was entitled to complain that 
Simpson did not grasp the important argument that had emerged in the vast 
literature on ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ that the Coase Theorem is purely 
theoretical and of no direct value in the formulation of policy.116 By 1996, the 
year the debate we are discussing was published, the belief that Coase thought 
that the Coase Theorem could have such a value had been shown to be quite 
wrong.117 The way was led by Medema in economic history118 and Schlag in 
law,119 but Coase himself was the main contributor. Simpson seems to have 
had some inkling that his criticisms of Coase were not entirely accurate.120 But 
a complete lack of sympathy with ‘economic rationality’ prevented him from 
seeing that Coase was one of the most radical (and successful) critics of key 
dimensions of the neoclassical mainstream of modern economics, and this led 
Simpson continually to attribute to Coase positions it was the entire purpose 
of ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ to reject. The issues of theoretical interest in 
the interpretation of Coase now lie elsewhere,121 and there is no need to show 
that Simpson profoundly misunderstands Coase’s theoretical views in general. 
But let us take up those parts of his misunderstanding that have a direct 
bearing on the law of nuisance as it is and as it could be. 
 
 114 Coase, ‘The Firm, the Market and the Law’, above n 79, 15. 
 115 Simpson, ‘An Addendum’, above n 5, 101. 
 116 Coase, ‘Reply to Simpson’, above n 4, 105. 
 117 David Campbell, ‘On What is Valuable in Law and Economics’ (1996) 8 Otago Law Review 
489, 498–505. 
 118 Steven G Medema, ‘The Myth of Two Coases: What Coase Is Really Saying’ (1994) 28 Journal 
of Economic Issues 208, 209–10, quoting R H Coase, ‘The Coase Theorem and the Empty 
Core: A Comment’ (1981) 24 Journal of Law and Economics 183, 187. 
 119 Pierre Schlag, ‘An Appreciative Comment on Coase’s The Problem of Social Cost: A View 
from the Left’ [1986] Wisconsin Law Review 919. Schlag was able to build on points which 
had been raised by Calabresi: Guido Calabresi, ‘Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the 
Law of Torts’ (1961) 70 Yale Law Journal 499. But Calabresi’s first article dedicated to the 
direct reinterpretation of Coase was Guido Calabresi, ‘The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying 
Coase Further’ (1991) 100 Yale Law Journal 1211. 
 120 See Simpson, ‘The Story of Sturges v Bridgman’, above n 1, 17. 
 121 David Campbell and Matthias Klaes, ‘The Principle of Institutional Direction: Coase’s 
Regulatory Critique of Intervention’ (2005) 29 Cambridge Journal of Economics 263, 277. 
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B  Solving Nuisance Cases ‘Does Not Entail Attempting To Reach 
an Economically Efficient Solution’ 
We have argued that Coase was right to maintain that some notion of 
economic efficiency does lie behind decision-making in nuisance cases. As we 
have seen, Simpson flatly denied this, and, as a matter of legal history, he 
claimed that: ‘After some controversy it came to be settled in mid-nineteenth 
century common law that this basic principle was not to be displaced by the 
public interest in economic development’.122 Making this claim involved him 
taking a very different line than the works of legal history which argued that 
the modern law of nuisance is based on its distance from the sic utere rule to 
which we have previously referred, and he did so, not so much in the article 
we are discussing, but in a chapter of his Leading Cases in the Common Law 
written at about the same time.123 This chapter examined a very important 
Victorian nuisance case, St Helen’s Smelting Co v Tipping (‘Tipping’),124 which 
Simpson claimed resolved the conflict between the sic utere and the give and 
take principles in favour of the former. Simpson’s outstanding eminence 
as a legal historian and the fact that he is but recently deceased make one 
reluctant to say, as we are obliged to do, that his doing this involved misinter-
preting both Tipping, which actually was part of the process of abandonment 
of the sic utere rule, and of McLaren’s important work of legal history which 
we have mentioned. 
In Tipping a private landowner obtained an injunction against a neigh-
bouring copper smelting works and ultimately forced the works to close. Very 
noxious emissions, principally from a chimney less than half a mile from the 
landowner’s property, were found to have inter alia damaged trees and other 
cultivated plants on the property. But Tipping turned on a distinction which 
was drawn between ‘material injury to the property’, such as the visible 
damage done to the trees and plants, and more general ‘inconvenience and 
interference with one’s enjoyment’,125 and this distinction has been repeatedly 
observed in subsequent nuisance cases. This distinction is, of course, ultimate-
 
 122 Simpson, ‘The Story of Sturges v Bridgman’, above n 1, 38 (citations omitted). 
 123 Simpson, Leading Cases, above n 94, ch 7. In a 2001 edition of Leading Cases, the preface 
and the publishing record of which leads one to think it is simply a reprint of the 1995 edi-
tion, a reference to the article we are discussing was added: A W Brian Simpson, Leading 
Cases in the Common Law (Oxford University Press, revised ed, 2001) 194 n 126. This 
chapter was cited in support of the argument in Simpson, ‘The Story of Sturges v Bridgman’, 
above n 1, 38 n 76. 
 124 (1865) 11 HL Cas 642; 11 ER 1483. 
 125 Ibid 650; 1486 (Lord Westbury LC). 
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ly unsustainable and irrelevant to the basic issue anyway, but its significance is 
that it effectively condoned industrial pollution of a general sort. In the terms 
Simpson used in ‘The Story of Sturges v Bridgman’, Tipping is a landmark case 
in the erosion of protection from ‘less tangible interference’ that he thought it 
was the very function of the law of nuisance to provide.126 Simpson uninten-
tionally actually provided what we believe was formerly unknown evidence of 
this erosion when he told us that, after being forced to close, ‘the company 
moved its operations … some three miles away, from where it could continue 
to pollute the [plaintiff ’s] [e]state, albeit much less severely’.127 Having shown 
that the plaintiff landowner, an extremely rich and eccentrically obstinate 
person, had been prepared to spend simply enormous effort and expense on 
winning the action he brought, Simpson does not explain this plaintiff ’s 
acceptance of what he must have found just as intolerable an interference in 
his strict rights, were those rights strict.128 The only explanation is that private 
nuisance rights are not strict but are inherently contingent in the way we have 
claimed. 
The account of Tipping we have just given condenses that of Brenner as 
essentially affirmed by McLaren.129 These works are cited in Simpson’s chapter 
on Tipping but not discussed in any detail.130 He does, however, sum up 
McLaren’s work, in praise of which he is fulsome:131 
J. P. S. McLaren, in a notable study, … has shown how the common law of nui-
sance played a relatively unimportant part in controlling pollution, not pri-
marily because of its doctrinal form, but because other social and institutional 
factors diminished its utility.132 
By these factors Simpson means the transaction costs of legal action and the 
unequal distribution of the capacity to absorb those costs consequent upon 
inequality of wealth. These obviously are highly important, and in his article 
McLaren examined the relative significance of ‘what the courts said and did’ 
 
 126 Simpson, ‘The Story of Sturges v Bridgman’, above n 1, 38. 
 127 Simpson, Leading Cases, above n 94, 191. 
 128 Ibid. Simpson also tells us that the plaintiff did not even try to obtain an injunction, which 
was the only remedy he would have thought adequate, against another somewhat more 
distant smelting works, but offers only what seems to be a very insufficient reason for this. 
 129 Brenner, above n 94, 412–20; McLaren, above n 94, 156–8. 
 130 Simpson, Leading Cases, above n 94, 172 n 35. 
 131 In the first version of ‘The Story of Sturges v Bridgman’ he describes this article as a ‘classic’: 
Simpson, ‘Coase v Pigou Reexamined’, above n 1, 82. 
 132 Simpson, Leading Cases, above n 94, 193. 
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and of ‘institutional or social impediments to suit’ as factors ‘which hampered 
legal action to counteract industrial pollution’.133 McLaren essentially con-
cluded, contra Brenner, that the latter played a far greater role than the former 
in rendering the common law impotent in face of the polluting effects of the 
industrial revolution. 
But, though it happens that we have a number of points of disagreement 
with McLaren, on the point of interest here, the substance of the legal 
doctrine, we have no disagreement. The analysis McLaren puts forward 
essentially is that of Brenner, with which McLaren himself did not disagree. 
McLaren summarises Brenner’s analysis thus: 
In essence, what the courts, and especially the House of Lords in [Tipping], did 
was to take the traditional maxim of sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, which 
prior to the nineteenth century had always worked in favour of hallowed resi-
dential and agricultural uses of land, and to re-define it, giving it a more relative 
quality which allowed for sympathetic discussion of the economic context and 
social utility of industrial activity.134 
Of this analysis, McLaren says: ‘As far as his analysis goes, there is no 
doubt that Brenner is correct’.135 With respect, it is quite wrong, then, of 
Simpson to use McLaren’s article as support for his argument about the 
substance of the law of nuisance as opposed to the social effect, or lack of 
social effect, of the common law. The views of Brenner on the substance of the 
law, not challenged by McLaren, contradict Simpson’s argument. 
It is, in truth, impossible to deny that use of the language of ‘economics’ is 
not uncommonly found in the judgments in the leading 19th century nuisance 
cases, including Sturges v Bridgman and Tipping, in much the jumbled way 
that Coase claimed. And, having, as we have seen, told us that ‘the common 
 
 133 McLaren, above n 94, 159. 
 134 Ibid 157 (citations omitted). Simpson refers to McLaren three times in ‘The Story of Sturges v 
Bridgman’, on the first and third occasions in connection with points not in dispute here, but 
on the second to make a claim about McLaren’s argument that we suspect involves the misin-
terpretation of McLaren: see Simpson, ‘The Story of Sturges v Bridgman’, above n 1, 10 n 3, 12 
n 13, 19 n 25. In Brenner, above n 94, 413–14 (emphasis altered), his conclusion about Tip-
ping was that: 
St Helen’s made actions in respect of discomfort virtually impossible in the industrial 
Midlands and in [similar] regions such as Swansea and Cardiff. This is not to say that a 
successful action in respect of discomfort caused by an industrial nuisance was no longer 
conceivable in an industrial town, but the discomfort would have had to be direct, imme-
diate, and obviously physical as in trespass. An eye put out by a cinder would have done, 
but not severe personal discomfort. 
 135 McLaren, above n 94, 158. 
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law rejected the idea of permitting the economically efficient level of pollu-
tion’, Simpson then said: 
However the judges, and no doubt juries, in determining what is to count as an 
actionable nuisance, which is bound to involve questions of degree, have no 
doubt always accepted the idea that some level of mutual tolerance and adjust-
ment between landowners is necessary if life is to go on, given the fact that the 
effects of land use are bound to cross territorial boundaries, and no doubt too a 
rough and ready economic calculus has been significant at the margins. To this 
weak extent the reciprocal nature of problems of conflicting land use has been 
accepted by the oracles of the law, and presumably by members of juries too. 
But in so far as economic considerations have been taken into consideration 
this does not mean that a rigorous system of analysis has replaced a less rigor-
ous legal analysis; economic arguments, in so far as they feature in legal deci-
sions, have been impressionistic only.136 
If one acknowledges that all important cases are ‘at the margins’, which is why 
they are important, and that Coase made no claim whatsoever about the 
rigour of the courts’ approach, quite the opposite in fact, this is, in our 
opinion, an effective agreement with Coase’s position. 
The lack of sympathy that nevertheless led Simpson to press his criticism 
of Coase so doggedly ultimately turned on their differing conceptions of 
property rights and the role of such rights in economic and legal reasoning, 
and to this we now turn. 
C  Solving Nuisance Cases by Means of Coasean 
Bargaining Would Be ‘Offensive’ 
1 Bargaining Outcomes and Imposition of Outcomes in Law and Economics 
Simpson was rightly of the belief that his criticism of Coase raised issues 
about the nature of the fundamental freedoms to be enjoyed in liberal 
democratic society. It will be recalled that he rejected the idea he attributed to 
Coase that the aim in nuisance cases should be to ‘reach an economically 
efficient solution’ because ‘parties are not willing to place their rights in the 
market’ and it would be ‘offensive not to respect their unwillingness’.137 The 
offensiveness arises from the value of the institution of private property, the 
core of which he believed to be captured in Blackstone’s conceptualisation of 
 
 136 Simpson, ‘The Story of Sturges v Bridgman’, above n 1, 38. 
 137 Ibid 33. 
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property as ‘that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and 
exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right 
of any other individual in the universe’.138 Having quoted the relevant passage 
of The Commentaries,139 Simpson said: 
Despotic dominion is what the right of private property is all about, and it in-
cludes the right to behave in ways which make no contribution whatever to the 
national wealth. If I own a Renoir or a Picasso I may refuse every offer to pur-
chase it and do so since I have decided to burn it. …  
[In nuisance cases] notions of economic or social value are wholly irrele-
vant. They must be in a capitalist system which respects the right of private 
property, for it is not the business of the courts to substitute their despotic do-
minion to that of the litigants. … 
It does not in the least follow that in particular cases property rights should 
be allocated to those who will produce the most wealth … the law allows gifts 
to be made to the feckless and improvident, and testamentary dispositions too. 
Nincompoops may inherit, and contracts of sale are in no way affected by the 
fact that the purchaser is a shopaholic who has not the least use for the goods 
he purchases.140 
The point is that, as Professors Korngold and Morriss, the editors who 
reprinted Simpson’s article, put it, ‘Professor Simpson questions the use of 
efficiency as a guiding star for decisions and instead supports the freedom of 
owners to do what they like with their property, free of … social engineering 
by courts’.141 This article is written because we are in complete agreement 
about the value that Korngold and Morriss placed on this freedom. But it is 
this very freedom that informs Coase’s views, and those views far better 
articulate what is involved in economically and legally institutionalising that 
freedom than do Simpson’s own. 
 
 138 Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (Clarendon Press, 3rd ed, 
1765–69) vol 2, 2 (‘The Commentaries’). 
 139 Simpson, ‘The Story of Sturges v Bridgman’, above n 1, 34–5, quoting ibid. 
 140 Ibid 35, 37, 39. 
 141 Gerald Korngold and Andrew P Morriss, ‘Introduction’ in Gerald Korngold and Andrew P 
Morriss (eds), Property Stories (Foundation Press, 2004) 1, 3–4 (emphasis in original). Simp-
son discusses a very similar but in some respects superior argument in his chapter on Tip-
ping, and there contrasts ‘economic analysis’ to an ‘ethical’ concern with the protection of 
property rights: Simpson, Leading Cases, above n 94, 175. 
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Simpson does not, in fact, believe in despotic dominion, for the very good 
reason that no one can possibly believe in it.142 At the level at which we need 
to engage with the issue, the point may be simply made. Even if, to use 
Simpson’s example, we allow that one’s private property in a Picasso may 
enable one to burn it,143 one cannot burn it by throwing it on a fire that a 
neighbour has started to dispose of rubbish on his or her land, or burn it on 
one’s own land in such a way that would unreasonably interfere with the 
neighbour’s enjoyment of his or her land. One could go on. Social life 
inevitably imposes limits on despotic dominion. Simpson is, of course, 
perfectly well aware of this, and he spoke of the law of nuisance as a law which 
‘intervenes when either party engages in activities which significantly abridge 
the freedom of their neighbor’.144 But he did not recognise that the issue is not 
social coexistence as such but the way that the law of nuisance institutionalis-
es freedom of ownership so that, far from being absolute or even strict, it has 
been contingent — broadly giving social engineering priority to economic 
growth over the sic utere rule. The very freedom that Simpson sought to 
protect is the freedom that it is of the nature of the positive law of private 
nuisance not to protect. 
The fundamental theoretical point on which Simpson’s argument turned 
was its failure to come to terms with the distinction between property rules 
and liability rules which may well be the most important conceptual innova-
 
 142 Blackstone did conceive of private property as an ‘absolute’ right, and opposed such rights to 
‘relative’ rights which ‘result from, and are posterior to, the formation of states and societies’: 
The Commentaries, vol 1, 124. But, putting to one side the background understanding of 
natural and positive law which gives the distinction its full meaning, it is unsustainable as a 
distinction within the positive law of private property, and that law is always relative, even in 
Blackstone’s own treatment of it. When first placing property on the list of absolute rights, he 
defines it as the ‘free use, enjoyment, and disposal of all his acquisitions, without any control 
or diminution, save only by the laws of the land’: at 138 (emphasis added). Blackstone’s treat-
ment, whilst of the first importance in a legal sense of course, is not of great help in address-
ing the most profound theoretical issues: see generally Charles S Telly, ‘The Classical Eco-
nomic Model and the Nature of Property in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries’ (1978) 
13 Tulsa Law Journal 406. 
 143 Simpson, ‘The Story of Sturges v Bridgman’, above n 1, 35. We are grateful to Professor Robert 
Burrell for pointing out, however, that in many jurisdictions one’s property right in a Picasso 
might not allow destruction of the painting. This is because, for at least as long as copyright 
continues to subsist (as it does in Picasso’s works), the author’s ‘moral rights’ would provide a 
right against destruction. This has long been true in civil law countries, but is also increasing-
ly true in common law countries. For example, in the United States the author of a work of 
visual art shall have the right ‘to prevent any destruction of a work of recognized stature, and 
any intentional or grossly negligent destruction of that work is a violation of that right’: 17 
USC § 106A(3)(B) (2011). See also Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 195AK, 195AQ(2). 
 144 Simpson, ‘The Story of Sturges v Bridgman’, above n 1, 37. 
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tion made within law and economics other than Coase’s own contribution to 
the conceptualisation of the transaction cost.145 Of the relevance of this 
distinction Simpson said: 
Valuable though the distinction is, confusion can be caused here by contrasting 
entitlements protected by property rules from entitlements protected by liabil-
ity rules, or property rights with liability rules. The statement of a property right 
is the statement of an entitlement which the law protects; in a sense it is a 
statement of an ideal. … The enthusiasm or intensity of protection varies, so 
that in relation to personal property, much of which is fungible, orders for spe-
cific restitution are commonly not available. [With rights in land, specific re-
covery in cases of dispossession is available partly because it is more practica-
ble, and partly because land is not treated as fungible.] To view this as a legal 
recognition that people can take other people’s personal property so long as 
they pay for it seems to me to be profoundly mistaken. In the world we live in, 
which is partly structured by law, that is not the understanding. To do so will 
usually, but not always, constitute a criminal offence.146 
Simpson’s use of the word ‘take’ when he said that ‘people can take other 
people’s property so long as they pay for it’ elides the basis of the distinction 
between property rules and liability rules in a most instructive way. The 
distinction is not between economic goods which can and cannot be bought 
but between two different ways of determining the value at which the sale 
takes place.147 Goods legally institutionalised by property rules may be bought 
only at a value subjectively determined by their private owner. Goods legally 
institutionalised by liability rules may be bought at a value objectively 
 
 145 Calabresi and Melamed, above n 13. 
 146 Simpson, ‘The Story of Sturges v Bridgman’, above n 1, 37 (emphasis in original); the sentence 
in square brackets has been moved and inserted to emphasise the contrast between various 
intensities of protection at which Simpson is driving. 
 147 As we have just put it, this is in a sense misleading, but we will continue to speak in this way 
as the simplification involved is valuable and unobjectionable once one is clear one is making 
it. Simpson rightly said that goods are a bundle of legal rules, including property and liability 
rules: ibid. He does not seem to have fully appreciated the significance of the point that 
Calabresi and Melamed, above n 145, 1093, made the same point. Behind this lies the fact 
that, as all the institutions of modern society, including private property, rest on a constitu-
tional framework provided by the state, ultimately there are no property rules. Nevertheless, 
it is submitted, the distinction between such rules and liability rules retains its value. As it 
was put by W Stanley Jevons, The State in Relation to Labour (Macmillan, 4th ed, 1910) 12: 
‘No laws, no customs, no rights of property are so sacred that they may not be made away 
with, if it can be clearly shown that they stand in the way of the greatest happiness. Salus 
populi, suprema lex’. 
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determined by the state.148 A party therefore may buy a good institutionalised 
by a property rule only if he or she secures the voluntary agreement of the 
owner to the sale by offering what the owner believes is an acceptable price. 
That it is possible to take property by paying for it in this way is market 
exchange, though the word ‘take’ is inapt to describe a process based on 
voluntary agreement. On the other hand, it is possible to ‘buy’ a good 
institutionalised by a liability rule without the voluntary agreement of the 
owner by imposing what the state determines is the correct price. The obvious 
example is eminent domain, but regulated pricing of all types (including the 
regulation of terms which go to the adequacy of consideration) imposes a 
price on sales between private parties. The word ‘take’ is, to various degrees, 
apt to describe this process. 
One who respects the sense of freedom involved in despotic dominion that 
Simpson endorses will find liability rules prima facie objectionable, but, of 
course, social engineering cases can be made out for them based on the public 
interest, and Simpson was, in fact, himself highly sympathetic to eminent 
domain.149 In a celebrated lecture to the Selden Society on Bradford v Pick-
les,150 Simpson strongly criticised the refusal of the law of England and Wales 
to develop a law of abuse of rights in order to curtail what Simpson saw (as it 
happens quite wrongly) as a private landowner’s attempt to exercise his 
despotic dominion over water percolating through his land, to the frustration 
of the Borough of Bradford which wished to tap the water. 
Simpson’s strongly-expressed views in this lecture completely contradict 
the views expressed in ‘The Story of Sturges v Bridgman’ and in his chapter on 
Tipping, but we will put this to one side. However, if one starts with an idea 
that private property in land should involve ownership on the sic utere basis 
which most closely approximates to despotic dominion, what is completely 
unacceptable about the positive law of private nuisance is, not that it places 
a value on allowing interference, but that it institutionalises a liability rule 
under which the value of the interference is determined by the courts and 
 
 148 Calabresi and Melamed, above n 13, 1092. 
 149 A W B Simpson, Victorian Law and the Industrial Spirit (Selden Society, 1995) 16–17. In the 
course of his argument in this lecture, Simpson criticised the concept of ‘some ideal theoreti-
cal world’ in which ‘everyone behaves with economic rationality’: at 7. This lecture was the 
starting point for the definitive historical account of Bradford v Pickles [1895] AC 587 in an 
equally celebrated book published in the series of Oxford Studies in Modern Legal History 
under Simpson’s general editorship: Taggart, above n 57. See also: David Campbell, ‘Gather-
ing the Water: Abuse of Rights after the Recognition of Government Failure’ (2010) 7 The 
Journal Jurisprudence 487. 
 150 [1895] AC 587. 
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that value is often zero. If a nuisance is found but a perpetual prohibitory 
injunction is denied and compensatory damages awarded, the court deter-
mines the value of the interference. If interference is shown but it is found to 
be reasonable so that there is no nuisance, the court is allowing that interfer-
ence at zero cost.151 
If the law of nuisance were to approximate to the institutionalisation of a 
property rule, then nuisance would have to be based on strict liability for 
interference rather than the give and take principle, and the normal remedy 
would have to be a perpetual prohibitory injunction.152 This would be to grant 
a chose in action to the owner of the affected land and a neighbour whose use 
would lead to interference would have to buy off the injunction at a price 
which the owner voluntarily agreed. This obviously would be something like 
the hypothetical situation Coase examined in Part III of ‘The Problem of 
Social Cost’. If it was made similarly clear that no nuisance would be found (it 
is hard to conceive of the legal design of the necessary right), then this would 
be like the Part IV hypothetical situation.  It certainly would be far more like 
these situations than the positive law of private nuisance.153 
The problems with either of Coase’s hypothetical situations are manifest.154 
Once it is realised that the injunction can be bought off, it is not that ‘The 
Pricing System with Liability for Damage’ would simply prevent industrialisa-
tion. It is that, prima facie, the transaction costs of negotiating the permis-
sions to interfere necessary to, for example, allow industrial smoke pollution 
would be impossibly high. The result of liability for damage would, then, 
amount to much the same thing as simple prevention: 
 
 151 For a review of the range of possibilities see Harris, Campbell and Halson, above n 92, 513–
18. An interesting comment on United Kingdom law and practice has recently been provided 
by Professor Ben Pontin, who we have noted is a leading authority on the Victorian history of 
nuisance: Pontin, Nuisance Law and Environmental Protection, above n 94, ch 1. 
 152 And so, as Epstein seminally argued, the law of remedies for nuisance (and in general) ‘will 
never have a hard-edged and rigorous structure’ whilst it is concerned with both ‘justice’ and 
‘utilitarian constraints’ on justice: see Richard A Epstein, ‘Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice 
and Its Utilitarian Constraints’ (1979) 8 Journal of Legal Studies 49, 98. See generally Richard 
A Epstein, ‘A Theory of Strict Liability’ (1973) 2 Journal of Legal Studies 151. 
 153 The thought immediately strikes the tort lawyer that strict liability under ‘the rule in 
Rylands v Fletcher’ would, therefore, be the basis of a superior law: see Rylands v Fletcher 
(1868) LR 3 HL 330. But, without arguing it here, we believe that this rule has been so diluted 
that it is now as contingent as private nuisance. Simpson discussed Rylands v Fletcher in 
Leading Cases, above n 94, 195. 
 154 Though Simpson is so insistent on despotic dominion that he simply denies the force of 
problems such as the hold-up problem: Simpson, ‘The Story of Sturges v Bridgman’, above 
n 1, 34. We put this to one side. 
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Once the costs of carrying out market transactions are taken into account, it is 
clear that … a rearrangement of rights will only be undertaken when the in-
crease in the value of production consequent upon the rearrangement is greater 
than the costs which would be involved in bringing it about. When it is less, the 
granting of an injunction (or the knowledge that it would be granted) or the li-
ability to pay damages may result in an activity being discontinued (or may 
prevent its being started) which would be undertaken if market transactions 
were costless. In these conditions, the initial delimitation of legal rights does 
have an effect on the efficiency with which the economic system operates.155 
It would be much the same in the situation of ‘The Pricing System with No 
Liability for Damage’, except, of course, that prima facie the transaction costs 
of negotiation would mean that limits could not normally be placed on 
general interference caused by industrial use. This is essentially what 
happened in Victorian Britain. But as the basis of the discussion in Parts III 
and IV of ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ is that transaction costs are assumed to 
be zero, it inevitably follows that the optimal level of interference is estab-
lished, whether or not there initially is liability, as a logical consequence of 
this assumption.156 
The point is that, far from assuming this assumption did apply, Coase 
thought it would never apply, and in Part VI turned his attention to the 
situation when ‘The Cost of Market Transactions [is] Taken into Account’. We 
believe it is now possible to precisely identify the reason his argument in ‘The 
Problem of Social Cost’ encouraged confusion about that argument. To 
repeat: prior to Part VI, Coase had in Parts III and IV discussed the issues on 
the assumption of zero transaction costs, and in Part V he illustrated this by 
reference to actual cases such as Sturges v Bridgman. It must be said that his 
accounts of those cases are, as we have shown in respect of Sturges v Bridg-
man, profoundly misleading, and this was necessarily the case because the 
assumption of zero transaction costs cannot possibly apply to actual cases. 
Coase’s way of illustrating his argument in Part V is exceedingly unfortunate. 
In Part VII Coase engaged with these cases again after having, in 
Part VI, dropped the assumption of zero transaction costs. The consequence 
 
 155 Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’, above n 2, 115. 
 156 Though Coase occasionally engaged with it in explication and defence of his general 
confidence in bargaining solutions, we put to one side the problem whether the hold-up 
problem can be conceived as a consequence of transaction costs or a property of economic 
action regardless of transaction costs. 
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of dropping this assumption is that the market may not yield the 
optimum outcome: 
the assumption [of zero transaction costs] … is, of course, a very unrealistic as-
sumption. [The operations necessary] [i]n order to carry out a market transac-
tion … are often extremely costly, sufficiently costly at any rate to prevent many 
transactions that would be carried out in a world in which the pricing system 
worked without cost. … One arrangement of rights may bring about a greater 
value of production than any other. … But … the costs of reaching [this] result 
by altering and combining rights through the market may be so great that this 
optimal arrangement of rights, and the greater value of production it would 
bring, may never be achieved.157 
In Part VI this led Coase to consider the alternative governance structures 
of the firm and the government and, most importantly, to set up the principle 
of determining policy for the empirical world as ‘one of choosing the appro-
priate social arrangement’.158 Before turning to the significance of this, we 
must note that when in Part VII Coase again turned to actual cases, including 
Sturges v Bridgman, now assuming that transaction costs are positive, his 
argument was that the decisions in those cases show that ‘the courts directly 
influence economic activity’159 when they reach judgments aware, if ‘not 
always … very clearly’,160 of the reciprocal nature of the problem: 
In a world in which there are costs of rearranging the rights established by the 
legal system, the courts, in cases relating to nuisance, are, in effect, making a 
decision on the economic problem and determining how resources are to be 
employed. … [T]he courts are conscious of this and … they often make … a 
comparison between what would be gained and what would be lost by prevent-
ing actions which have harmful effects.161 
Rather than facilitate the bargaining by which the parties determine the 
outcome, the courts are here themselves stipulating the outcome. This is an 
essentially accurate account of what does go on in nuisance cases. But this 
does not prevent the way Coase handled the point being extremely misleading 
in terms of the argument he sought to advance. Despite the apparent realism 
 
 157 Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’, above n 2, 114–15. 
 158 Ibid 118. There also is, Coase says here, the ‘further alternative, which is to do nothing about 
the problem at all’. 
 159 Ibid 119. 
 160 Ibid 123. 
 161 Ibid 132–3. 
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of Part V, the bargaining Coase described in ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ is 
the bargaining at zero transaction cost that in Parts III and IV effectively sets 
up the Coase Theorem. Parts VI and VII then allowed positive transaction 
costs, and, most curiously, bargaining played no further part whatsoever in 
Coase’s argument. When transaction costs are positive, Coase, in Part VI, 
considered the firm and government as alternative governance structures to 
common law decision-making, and then, in Part VII, considered decision-
making by the courts rather than decision-making by the parties, the latter 
almost completely disappearing from his article. The presence of transaction 
costs, which of course prevents theoretical Pareto efficiency being achieved, 
led Coase to drop bargaining as a plausible governance structure altogether, 
with the consequence that, incredible to say in light of the history of the 
interpretation of the article, there is actually no examination of the empirical 
use of ‘Coasean bargaining’ in ‘The Problem of Social Cost’. 
This was not, of course, Coase’s intention, and it is a particularly difficult 
point of interpretation because the article on ‘The Federal Communications 
Commission’ of which, as we have mentioned, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ 
was intended to be a generalising restatement, is a paradigmatic policy 
argument for Coasean bargaining, proposing what would now be called a 
quasi-market in broadcasting frequencies then thought of their nature to be 
public goods. But in the restatement in ‘The Problem of Social Cost’, no 
positive proposals for bargaining when transaction costs are positive, or for 
the design of a legal framework for bargaining in these circumstances, are 
made. Having set out in Part VI the reasons why we must consider the firm 
and government as alternative forms of ‘appropriate social arrangement’162 to 
the market, Coase returned to the factory emission of smoke which he took as 
a ‘standard example’ of a harm at the start of Part I. In a very significant 
passage he almost immediately then said that it is ‘particularly likely’ that 
‘government administrative regulation’ will ‘lead to an improvement in 
economic efficiency’ when, ‘as is normally the case with the smoke nuisance, a 
large number of people is involved and … therefore the costs of handling the 
problem through the market or the firm may be high’.163 To the extent, then, 
that Coase puts forward any concrete policy proposal in ‘The Problem of 
Social Cost’, it is in fact one of government intervention. 
 
 162 Ibid 118. 
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The significance of this has escaped the many who, like Simpson, believe 
Coase was extremely biased against such intervention,164 for surely it is an 
instance of what we believe is most valuable in Coase, his insistence on even-
handedness when choosing the ‘appropriate social arrangement’.165 Now it 
may well be the case that the factory smoke harm is unamenable to bargaining 
solutions, indeed it may be a paradigm case of a lack of such amenability. But 
it shows how little Coase was concerned in ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ 
(unlike in ‘The Federal Communications Commission’) to actually explore the 
real-world possibility of employing bargaining, that the smoke harm was the 
first example he mentioned in Part VI when, crucially, ‘The Cost of Market 
Transactions [is] Taken into Account’.166 
2 Coase and the Nature of Law and Economics 
The principal confusion to which ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ has given rise 
is, as we can now see, caused by the way when, putting aside his wholly 
inaccurate use of actual cases such as Sturges v Bridgman to illustrate the 
Coase Theorem, Coase describes what did happen in actual nuisance cases. 
This description is accurate, but it simply does not emerge that the description 
is not of bargaining solutions but of court imposition of solutions. Though it 
was a development at common law, this was, just as much as prescription by 
government and legislature, the stipulation of an outcome 
by the state. Simpson was entirely right to point to this as a serious anoma-
ly,167 and it is difficult to overstate the amount of confusion Coase’s argument 
has caused here. 
Let us quote again the passage which we believe expresses the core of the 
attractiveness of the Coase Theorem, which is its application of market-
 
 164 Simpson, ‘The Story of Sturges v Bridgman’, above n 1, 16. What Simpson precisely says is that 
‘a deep skepticism as to the desirability of government intervention’ ‘runs through all Coase’s 
writings’. Now, in fact, this could be said to be true of all of Coase’s later writings, but Simp-
son does not mean ‘skepticism’, he means ‘bias against’. 
 165 Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’, above n 2, 118. See generally Campbell, ‘On What Is 
Valuable in Law and Economics’, above n 117, 496–505; Campbell and Klaes, ‘The Principle 
of Institutional Direction’, above n 121. 
 166 Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’, above n 2, 114. Even three decades later, when the wider 
ramifications of his transaction cost arguments had become much more apparent, he ex-
plained his analysis in ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ with explicit reference to the simplifying 
assumption of prohibitive levels of transaction costs that rule out bargaining solutions: 
Coase, ‘Notes on the Problem of Social Cost’, above n 19, 175. 
 167 Simpson, ‘The Story of Sturges v Bridgman’, above n 1, 21. 
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generated Pareto efficiency to situations previously thought to be outside the 
Pareto domain: 
the immediate question faced by the courts is not what shall be done by whom 
but who has the legal right to do what. It is always possible to modify by trans-
actions on the market the initial legal delimitation of rights. And, of course, if 
such market transactions are costless, such a rearrangement of rights will al-
ways take place if it will lead to an increase in the value of production.168 
Though Coase argues for a bargaining solution to problems of ‘harm’, he rests 
his doing so on the claim ‘that it will lead to an increase in the value of 
production’. Now, Coase means by this that it is such an increase that will 
motivate the parties to bargain, and the mutual expectation of advantage is 
what does, indeed, motivate all bargaining. But, as James Buchanan observed, 
this is a misleadingly ‘objectivist’ way of putting Coase’s point.169 It seems to 
envisage some overall increase in the value of production as a total social 
value which drives the process, when the entire point of private bargaining 
solutions, as opposed to planned solutions, is that the parties define the 
‘increase in value’ entirely subjectively in terms of expectation of increase in 
their own advantage. A Pareto efficient outcome is possible only because these 
subjective expectations, coordinated by the invisible hand, express the 
autonomous choices of economic actors. 
One might give little weight to this point as it relates to Coase’s advocacy of 
bargaining solutions. It may be said without creating confusion that, in a 
market setting, the Pareto efficient outcome will represent the overall value of 
production being maximised. But one must give the point enormous weight 
when one turns, as we have seen Coase turned in ‘The Problem of Social Cost’, 
away from bargaining solutions to actual decision-making by courts. For, ‘[i]n 
a world in which there are costs of rearranging the rights established by the 
legal system, the courts … are, in effect, making a decision on the economic 
problem and determining how resources are to be employed’.170 Courts taking 
this line are not establishing a framework within which economic actors will 
 
 168 Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’, above n 2, 114. 
 169 James M Buchanan, ‘Cost, Choice and Catallaxy: An Evaluation of Two Related but 
Divergent Virginia Paradigms’ in Francesco Parisi and Charles K Rowley (eds), The Origins of 
Law and Economics: Essays by the Founding Fathers (Edward Elgar, 2005) 156, 158 (emphasis 
altered). On Posner’s adoption of the ‘maximum value’ principle, see James M Buchanan, 
‘Good Economics — Bad Law’, Book Review: Economic Analysis of Law by Richard A Posner 
(1974) 60 Virginia Law Review 483. 
 170 Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’, above n 2, 132–3. 
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reach solutions by bargaining; they are prescribing the solutions. This, we take 
it, is what Coase means by ‘directly’ when he describes instances in which ‘the 
courts directly influence economic activity’.171 They of course do so in the 
belief ‘that they [are] affecting the working of the economic system — and in a 
desirable direction’,172 and any such belief must involve, however inarticulate-
ly, a claim to know how to increase the social value of production in the 
misleadingly objectivist way criticised by Buchanan, and a further claim to be 
able to make decisions which realise that value. By immediately abandoning 
bargaining solutions when transaction costs are positive and moving to the 
sort of decision-making he describes in the positive law of private nuisance, 
Coase moved in a most confusing way from the courts establishing a negotiat-
ing framework for private parties’ solutions to the courts as an agency of the 
state imposition of solutions. 
It is not going too far to say that this confusion in Coase has been the very 
basis of the Posnerian approach that has dominated the development of law 
and economics since ‘The Problem of Social Cost’.173 Posner himself typically 
confines bargaining solutions to general equilibrium situations in which 
bargaining would yield Pareto efficient outcomes, for he thinks that the 
presence of transaction costs prevents theoretical Pareto efficiency, as it 
indeed does, but also that this makes bargaining solutions of little relevance to 
real world situations. His characteristic position actually is that ‘[a]s is well 
known, the Pareto solution is apparent rather than real’,174 because it requires 
conditions that ‘can only rarely be fulfilled’,175 and so we are faced with a 
general problem of ‘the unavailability of a practical method for eliciting 
express consent’.176 The core of Posnerian law and economics is the identifica-
tion of principles of economic efficiency, notably welfare maximisation, which 
 
 171 Ibid 119. 
 172 Ibid 107. 
 173 The argument of the next two paragraphs condenses that made at proper length and with full 
referencing in David Campbell, ‘Welfare Economics for Capitalists: The Economic Conse-
quences of Judge Posner’ (2012) 33 Cardozo Law Review 2233. Appreciation of the welfare 
economic basis of Posner’s treatment of reasoning in court makes his, on the face of it bewil-
dering, recent apparent volte-face to advocacy of Keynes and Pigou perfectly easy to under-
stand: David Campbell, ‘The End of Posnerian Law and Economics’ Book Review: A Failure 
of Capitalism: The Crisis of ’08 and the Descent into Depression by Richard A Posner (2010) 73 
Modern Law Review 305. 
 174 Richard A Posner, The Economics of Justice (Harvard University Press, 1981) 88, citing Guido 
Calabresi and Philip Bobbitt, Tragic Choices (W W Norton, 1978) 83–5. 
 175 Ibid 55. 
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can guide courts which therefore have to stipulate outcomes — as Pareto 
efficiency realised through bargaining has little application: ‘the Pareto-
superiority criterion is inapplicable to most policy questions’177 as it is very 
often unable to endorse a ‘move [which] must increase the wealth of socie-
ty’.178 As Posner came to realise, this argument is not different in principle 
from Kaldor–Hicks efficiency, except that the goals of the policy are typically 
not the ‘left-wing’ ones normally associated with welfare economics but the 
‘right-wing’ ones of Posnerian law and economics. Posner has even gone so 
far to identify Kaldor–Hicks and welfare maximisation in Economic Analysis 
of Law: ‘the … concept of efficiency mainly used in this book [is] called the 
Kaldor–Hicks concept of efficiency, or wealth maximization’.179 
The question which obviously arises is whether the courts are in any better 
position to reach objective assessments of overall social welfare (and how to 
actualise it) than other state bodies, in particular the legislatures often 
castigated in Posnerian law and economics.180 We do not want to enter into a 
discussion of this question. It has been our aim merely to show that, following 
the confusion caused by Coase’s own quick abandonment of bargaining 
solutions in ‘The Problem of Social Cost’, Posnerian law and economics have 
themselves overwhelmingly not been concerned with bargaining solutions but 
with objective, state-imposed solutions when the Pareto domain is thought to 
be small to the point of non-existence. As it has principally been developed, 
law and economics completely reverses what Coase intended to do in ‘The 
Problem of Social Cost’. Law and economics of this sort does capture the 
nature of the positive law of private nuisance,181 but those law and economics, 
like that law, are not based on bargaining but on alternatives to bargaining. Is 
 
 177 Ibid 89. 
 178 Ibid 91. 
 179 Richard A Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (Wolters Kluwer, 9th ed, 2014) 14. 
 180 Ibid 729: ‘Judge-made rules are more likely to be efficiency-promoting than those made by 
legislatures, other than those legislature-made rules that codify common law principles’. The 
point was more fully stated in previous editions: Richard A Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 
(Aspen Publishers, 8th ed, 2011) §19.2, 713–14: ‘Although the correlation is far from perfect, 
judge-made rules tend to be efficiency-promoting whilst those made by legislatures, other 
than those rules that codify common law principles … tend to be efficiency-reducing’. As this 
distinction has been developed by Posner, the common law has predominantly come to mean 
court stipulation of outcomes in conformity with wealth maximising rules. This is at com-
plete variance with the distinction between ‘common law’ and ‘legislation’ predominantly 
drawn in liberal thought in which the former is conceived, not as the stipulation of outcomes, 
but as the setting of frameworks for decision-making by the parties themselves. 
 181 Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, above n 179, 62–5. 
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there any possibility of a reformed law of nuisance that would give greater 
scope to bargaining solutions? 
3 Nuisance as a Bargaining Solution 
For what it is worth, it is our belief that, in the 19th century circumstances — 
broadly the unprecedented possibilities of improvement brought about by 
industrialisation; pronounced inequality of wealth, an important part of 
which was overwhelmingly unequal distribution of the capacity to bring legal 
action; and, most importantly, the vestigial regulatory capacity of the state — 
nuisance had to be developed on a give and take basis, even though it there-
fore was made essentially irrelevant to the determination of the optimal level 
of pollution, or rather was the basis of a general, largely un-costed permission 
to pollute. But in light of the subsequent growth of very far-reaching systems 
of public planning permission and control,182 private nuisance should now be 
placed on a sic utere basis. By strengthening despotic dominion, this reform 
would provide those with the requisite interest in property with far greater 
power to oppose, or charge for, interference than they now normally enjoy, 
and the public planning system would always offer a possible check on the 
exercise of that power.183 And, indeed, a growing consciousness of govern-
ment failure in respect of the regulation of pollution has led to the exploration 
 
 182 After discussing nuisance at common law, in Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’, above n 2, 
119–26, Coase turned to the 19th century growth of statutory control of interference in Part 
VII: at 126–32, and returned to the theme in Part VIII as part of his explicit criticism of 
Pigou: at 135–42. He there raises the now very famous railway sparks example, his treatment 
of which is, choosing our words carefully, simply dismissed in Simpson, ‘The Story of Sturg-
es v Bridgman’, above n 1, 27 (the treatment is longer in Simpson, Leading Cases, above n 94, 
168–9). Coase’s own response to this criticism was largely unavailing: Coase, ‘Reply to Simp-
son’, above n 4, 111–13, and Simpson’s further contribution is highly critical of what Coase 
said: Simpson, ‘An Addendum’, above n 5, 100–1. Nevertheless, Coase was, in our opinion, 
essentially right about the railway sparks example. It is all very similar to the position over 
private nuisance which we are examining here, and a full discussion would require a treat-
ment at similar length to that discussion. The core of such a treatment may be found in: 
P S Atiyah, ‘Liability for Railway Nuisance in the English Common Law: A Historical Foot-
note’ (1980) 23 Journal of Law and Economics 191; Allen M Linden, ‘Strict Liability, Nuisance 
and Legislative Authorization’ (1966) 4 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 196. The particular value, 
as it were, added to Brenner’s and McLaren’s histories of nuisance by Morag-Levine, above n 
94, 56–62, is its more extensive discussion of the growth of the statutory regime in parallel 
with the common law regime, which was significantly different in the United Kingdom and 
the United States. 
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of the value of nuisance as ‘the environmental tort’.184 The expansion of the 
use of nuisance in this way could have a very positive effect on the ability of 
the private citizen to directly participate in the determination of the level of 
interference and thereby on the relationship of the private and public systems 
of regulation of pollution and other competing uses. We do not pretend to 
have done more than mount a prima facie case for this immense reform; 
perhaps not even that.185 We put it forward to indicate what we believe is 
latent in Coase’s own argument in ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ in order to 
clarify that argument. 
The irony of Simpson’s article is that the benefit of reading it strongly rein-
forces our belief that Coase missed a trick by not actually going into the 
possibilities of Coasean bargaining in ‘The Problem of Social Cost’. Simpson 
seizes on the fact that ‘no deal was done’ between Mr Bridgman and Dr 
Sturges in order to ridicule the possibility that devising ‘mechanisms for 
reducing … transaction costs’, or ‘leaving the outcome to the market is likely 
to be the best solution’: 
the resolution of the dispute … was indeed left to the market, in the sense that 
there was no legal impediment to their reaching an agreement which would 
have been binding upon them in private law. But though left to the market in 
this sense, no deal was done.186 
But, bringing to light previously unknown material from the background of 
Sturges v Bridgman, Simpson showed, in a way that certainly was no part of 
his intention, that Coasean bargaining actually did take place in the case, 
even if not in the reported litigation. It was for this reason that Simpson said 
that ‘[t]he case certainly illustrates the reciprocal nature of the problem of 
social cost’: 
 
 184 Campbell, ‘Of Coase and Corn’, above n 93 discusses this literature in the context of 
proposing a nuisance scheme for the introduction of genetically modified crops into the 
United Kingdom. 
 185 Amongst the number of much more substantial explorations of this possibility, one has 
particular relevance to the theoretical issues considered here. Prior to his early contribution 
to the legal strand of the reinterpretation of the Coase Theorem begun by Schlag (Robert C 
Ellickson, ‘The Case for Coase and Against “Coaseanism”’ (1989) 99 Yale Law Journal 611), 
and to the research which led to his outstanding reflections on the rancher and farmer exam-
ple (Robert C Ellickson, Order without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes (Harvard Univer-
sity Press, 1991)), Professor Ellickson had undertaken work in this vein: Robert C Ellickson, 
‘Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Use Controls’ (1973) 
40 University of Chicago Law Review 681. 
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In fact Dr Sturges did try negotiation, first complaining personally and then, in 
the spring of 1876, through his solicitor. The precise form of these negotiations 
is unrecorded, but from what Mr Bridgman said in reply we may guess that 
there was some suggestion that he might arrange to use his mortars at times 
when the consulting room was not in use. … 
In his affidavit Mr Bridgman, as if he had read Coase, indeed made the 
point that the problem was a reciprocal one, and he took the line that it was all 
the fault of Dr Sturges [by building the consulting room when he, Mr Bridg-
man, had operated his machinery for many years previously.] … In response to 
Dr Sturges’ complaint he had done what he could to confine the use of the mor-
tars to times which did not trouble the doctor. … He could do no more if he 
was to run his business. So it was that little was achieved in the negotiations, 
and the dispute came to litigation … Negotiation will normally precede litiga-
tion in nuisance cases of this kind. The story which emerges from the affidavits 
is a very everyday account of a dispute between neighbours, here both engaged 
in commercial activity, with an attempt to work out things amicably.187 
Now, a lawyer today, and no doubt just as much then, would expect pre-
cisely this to happen, but Coase could not have been expected to uncover this 
material, which has been brought to light only by the efforts of one of the 
greatest of modern legal historians. However, if he had had that material to 
hand, rather than misleadingly using Sturges v Bridgman effectively to claim 
that successful bargaining took place when it didn’t, Coase could have 
attempted to explain why the bargaining that actually did take place did not 
succeed, which would have involved a criticism of the shortcomings of the 
positive law, and of the extent to which it did pose a ‘legal impediment to their 
reaching an agreement’.188 By claiming too much for bargaining, he did not at 
all examine the extent of what might justifiably be claimed for it.189 
One has to ask what has happened to the ‘offensive’ use of bargaining to 
resolve problems of competing use? In the end, Simpson’s criticism of Coase 
turns on a rejection of ‘economic rationality’, and this rejection ultimately is 
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 188 Cf ibid 19. 
 189 Ellickson, of course, got this right: Robert C Ellickson, ‘Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute 
Resolution Among Neighbours in Shasta County’ (1986) 38 Stanford Law Review 623, 686: 
Although [my] findings are at odds with the literal features of the Coasean parable, they 
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not focused on ‘rationality’190 but on ‘economic’.191 Simpson rejected the very 
idea that a market transaction should play a role in resolving disputes over 
competing uses. We have already quoted Simpson’s argument that ‘[t]he 
reason why a market transaction in the sense of a purchase and sale of rights 
is … not possible in … situations [like Sturges v Bridgman] is that the parties 
are not willing to place their rights on the market’.192 This is an example of a 
general quality of social life: 
Life would be quite intolerable if individuals did not in general respect social 
limits to the market … Engaging in market transactions is just one form of 
human activity, and without such boundaries life would dissolve into unstruc-
tured chaos, in which it would be impossible to distinguish going shopping, 
from going out to dinner, or from going mountain climbing, or from going 
fishing with a friend. In the situation which confronted the doctor and the con-
fectioner an offer of money by Dr Sturges to help over [sic] any costs involved 
in moving or insulating the mortars might well have been socially acceptable, 
and would not, except to a certain type of economist anxious to assimilate all 
human action to market transactions, be thought of as a sale but rather as a 
contribution to the cost of action from which he would be the principal benefi-
ciary and from which he otherwise would be unjustly enriched. Anything more 
than such an offer would surely have bordered on the offensive.193 
As it happens, Simpson unknowingly scored a hit here as, in the limited 
comments he made on the nature of economic action, Coase did seem to 
commit himself to Becker’s extreme economic imperialism,194 from which 
 
 190 Simpson, ‘The Story of Sturges v Bridgman’, above n 1, 20, 40, attributed a commitment to 
hyper-rationalist cost-benefit analysis to Coase which Coase certainly did not have, and 
Simpson’s criticism of which, quite against his intention, would be more applicable to Pigou, 
though we cannot go into this here. 
 191 It was his blanket aversion to what he understood to be the ‘economic’ motivation of action 
that allowed Simpson both to defend an un-nuanced idea of despotic dominion in ‘The Story 
of Sturges v Bridgman’ and to reject it tout court in his lecture on Bradford v Pickles: Simpson, 
Victorian Law and the Industrial Spirit, above n 149, 16–17. In relation to Coase’s own early 
contribution to what is now known as ‘economic behaviourism’ see Matthias Klaes, ‘Transac-
tion Costs and Behavioural Economics’ in Morris Altman (ed), Real-World Decision Making: 
An Encyclopedia of Behavioral Economics (Greenwood, 2015) 440. 
 192 Simpson, ‘The Story of Sturges v Bridgman’, above n 1, 32. 
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 194 Coase, ‘The Firm, the Market and the Law’, above n 79, 2–5. Cf Campbell, ‘On What Is 
Valuable in Law and Economics’, above n 117, 496–507. 
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even Becker himself has now retreated.195 But does he score a hit on anything 
in Coase’s argument in ‘The Problem of Social Cost’? He undoubtedly is right 
that as a matter of legal history neither Dr Sturges and Mr Bridgman nor 
those who heard their case looked on the issues in clear, economic terms. His 
speculation about what they did think is highly plausible: 
No doubt Mr Bridgman thought he had a perfect right to go on using his mor-
tars as he and his father had done in the past, and you do not pay people money 
for a right you believe you already possess. … And no doubt Dr Sturges … 
thought he had a right to peace and quiet in his home, so that he could see his 
patients … and again you do not offer to pay people money for what is yours al-
ready. … In short I doubt if either of the two men questioned for one moment 
the right of the other to continue to pursue their business on their property.196 
But to the extent this was the parties’ thinking, then their thinking was 
nonsense. Such thinking would indeed leave them with a clash of what they 
believed to be absolute, unqualified rights to use, but as those uses were 
opposed, they could not possibly both have the right to their use. How was the 
clash of absolutes resolved, if this is the right word? That the parties them-
selves entered into negotiations prior to the eventual litigation showed that 
their thinking also involved some unclear perception of the reciprocal nature 
of the problem. That when these negotiations failed and the parties entered 
upon litigation, the Courts which heard the matter thought it uncontroversial 
that Dr Sturges could move to the nuisance is completely inexplicable unless 
they also had some such perception; and Simpson does, in fact, admit this. Of 
course, this perception was very unclear, but Coase never claimed more than 
this. Though we hope we have made it clear how far Simpson is correct about 
the legal history, Coase is correct at a far more fundamental level. He does not 
rest at the level of the parties’ self-understanding but shows the limits of that 
understanding. He also shows the limits of the positive law, and offers us the 
possibility of rethinking that law so as to make it capable of dealing far more 
adequately with problems of competing uses. 
If we are to utilise Coase’s insight, we have to accept the hard facts on 
which it is based. The problem is a reciprocal one. Giving up a polluting use 
does have costs. Determination of the best possible policy does require us to 
respect ‘economic’ considerations. Brian Simpson was of a generation the 
instinct of which was to regard self-consciousness of resource constraint as an 
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unworthy concession to ‘the market’. A moment’s reflection on influential 
political movements which would set us the goal of preventing pollution, or 
do not think the natural environment is a fit subject for economic policy, 
show that this attitude remains influential. 
VII  CO N C LU SI O N  
We have tried to show where Coase’s argument in ‘The Problem of Social 
Cost’ is deficient, not in its substance, for we have not taken up the points 
where we do think that argument is deficient in substance, but in its presenta-
tion of what we believe is substantially correct and, indeed, of seminal 
importance: the demonstration of, first, the reciprocal nature of the problem 
of competing uses and, secondly, that the legal framework within which that 
problem is handled is of the first importance in determining the optimality, or 
otherwise, of the result. The deficiencies in Coase’s argument that we have 
identified turn on Coase’s first use of actual cases such as Sturges v Bridgman 
in Part V of ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ being a very misleading illustration 
of the purely theoretical argument which we now know as the Coase Theo-
rem. Coase’s overall aim was to show that arguments about what would 
happen at zero transaction costs were irrelevant to determining policy and to 
argue that economists should stop making such arguments. Recourse to 
seemingly realistic illustrations drawn from actual cases was bound to cause 
confusion. But this is in fact of less importance than that, when he returned to 
those actual cases in Part VII, having abandoned the assumption of zero 
transaction costs, he did not explore the possibilities of what we would now 
call Coasean bargaining when transaction costs were positive. Instead he 
considered alternatives to such bargaining: the firm, government and cases 
decided by courts which stipulate outcomes. But courts making decisions in 
this way are not providing a framework for the parties to make decisions; they 
are intervening just as much as a government pursuing prescriptive statutory 
regulation. There is, in the end, too much state and not nearly enough 
voluntary exchange in ‘The Problem of Social Cost’, and in the predominant, 
Posnerian, strain of law and economics. 
The influence of the Coase Theorem on the reception of ‘The Problem of 
Social Cost’ shows that article to have been, in one sense, undeniably a failure. 
It is essential to acknowledge the shortcomings of Coase’s presentation of his 
argument in order to grasp the enormous underlying strength of that argu-
ment. Simpson’s criticism of Coase is perfectly correct in regard of the legal 
history of Sturges v Bridgman, but as regards the theory of law and economics, 
this criticism is in all important respects mistaken. That the Coase Theorem is 
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purely a theoretical device is something which it can be said it was, for 
reasons Simpson did not understand, Coase’s main aim to argue. The law of 
private nuisance does not provide a framework for Coasean bargaining, but 
this is because it is not a system of unqualified property rights but a liability 
rule generally qualifying those rights in the claimed public interest. Coase, to 
be sure, was himself confused on all these points, and this confusion coloured 
the argument of ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ and so the reception of that 
argument. Nevertheless, Coase’s position on the theoretical issues which 
emerge from his discussion of Sturges v Bridgman stands as the most pro-
found insight into the nature of those issues in, not merely law and econom-
ics, but post-war economics or law tout court. 
